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I. INTRODUCTION  
One of the most important roles that the U.S. forces can play in the 
fight against terrorist groups is to train, advise, and assist the forces 
of other nations in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist 
operations. The forces of many battleground countries today lack 
the tools, the training, and in some cases, the motivation to conduct 
effective operations against terrorist groups that are often elusive, 
well armed, and highly committed to their cause. With time and 
sustained effort, U.S. military training missions can make a real 
difference. 
David Ochmanek 1
A. FID IN THE PHILIPPINES  
In the fall of 2003, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) of the 
United States Air Force, deployed to the Philippines as part of a security 
assistance action. Over the next several weeks the members of this unit 
instructed Philippine army UH-1H helicopter pilots in the tactical use of Night 
Vision Goggles (NVGs), including how to conduct an infiltration/exfiltration 
(infil/exfil) into a remote, un-illuminated landing zone (LZ).2   
Several weeks later, Philippine army ground forces conducted a night raid 
against a suspected terrorist site, whence the team was ambushed and 
sustained four casualties. The team called for a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) 
and all four injured team members were extracted from the “hot”, dark, un-
prepared, LZ by pilots trained by the 6 SOS. Although one individual did 
succumb to his injuries while enroute back to the base, none of these individuals 
would have survived without the newly acquired equipment, skills and training 
provided by US personnel.3
Shortly thereafter, a public tip-off alerted Philippine forces to the 
whereabouts of al-Qaeda-linked, Abu Sayyaf’s top leader Galib Andang, 
 
1 David Ochmanek. “Military Operations Against Terror Groups Abroad: Implications for the 
United States Air Force”. Santa Monica: Rand. 2003. p. 245. 
2 Major Brian Downs. 6 SOS, Personal interview, 26 January 2005. 
3 Major Brian Downs. 6 SOS, Personal interview, 26 January 2005. 
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popularly known as “Commander Robot”. Abu Sayyaf under the leadership of 
Andang had been feared for their kidnapping sprees and bomb attacks against 
foreigners carried out in the southern Philippines for more than a decade, often 
beheading their victims if their ransom demands are not met. This time-sensitive 
information related Commander Robot’s location as in a remote and difficult to 
rapidly access location, thus the same team that had been trained by the 6 SOS 
and had conducted the MEDEVAC, was scrambled to perform the tactical 
infiltration of an assault team. The Philippine team was successful inserted, and 
a major fire-fight ensued. Andang initially escaped the battle, although severely 
wounded, but was captured in a neighboring town shortly thereafter. Armed 
Forces Chief General Narciso Abaya said a severe blow had been dealt the 
terrorist organization and the loss of their top leader would “intensify their hunt for 
the remaining Abu Sayyaf leaders”. A military spokesman also voiced optimism 
that the capture would reveal links to the broader terrorist group, Jemaah 
Islamiyah.4
B. WHAT IS FID? 
The previous two examples illustrate the powerful utility of Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID). FID is defined by Joint Publication 1-02, A Dictionary of Military 
Terms, as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any 
of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and 
insurgency.”5 More informally worded, FID is the mechanism by which the U.S. 
government uses diplomatic, economic, informational and military instruments to 
aid its allies in the security of their own nation. The genesis behind this strategy 
is that FID is a cost, time, and force multiplier given the breadth and depth of 
threats the United States faces in this world. 
One of the specific applications of U.S. military FID programs is via 
aviation assets, or Aviation FID (A-FID). Although the historical use of aircraft for 
 
4 “Commander Robot's capture big blow to Abu Sayyaf”. Sun Star Network Online, 8 
December 2003. 
5 United States. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Publication 1-02. 12 Apr 2001, amended 9 May 2005. p. 212. 
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Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)6 type roles extends back into the 
WWII era through early Vietnam, those applications of airpower ended shortly 
thereafter. In the twenty years that followed, air power theorists pondered the fate 
of FID, and some speculated that the “international perception that the U.S. can 
and will act militarily in a whole range of ways, from assisting friends to actual 
intervention to defend an important but not vital interest, is one this country may 
want to foster in the years ahead.”7  
A-FID was resurrected in 1994 as the 6th Special Operations Squadron, at 
Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 6th is the only A-FID organization in the U.S. military 
and was created to advise, train, and assist foreign aviation forces in the 
application of airpower. In that role, 6th members organize as Combat Aviation 
Advisors (CAA), and teach a broad spectrum of aviation related skills sets, 
including piloting, navigation, maintenance, airbase defense, logistics and 
intelligence, across the globe. 6 SOS personnel are specifically trained to be 
culturally, linguistically, and professionally oriented towards the regions in which 
they operate. All 6 SOS personnel are accomplished professionals in their 
respective specialty and are hand selected solely from volunteers for inclusion in 
the unique A-FID mission.8
The A-FID process is primarily aimed at the transmission of tactics, 
techniques and procedures to the host nation’s air forces. Although there are 
mechanisms to provide equipment to our allies, and FID trained organizations 
work closely with those transmission avenues, FID personnel focus on how best 
the host nation should use what assets they have available to them. As such, A-
 
6 IDAD are the host nation’s goals that FID aims to support. 
7 David J. Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. Air University Press: 
Alambama, 1986.  p. 7. 
8 The 6th Special Operations Squadron will be referenced many times throughout this 
discussion. It is desirable that this author convey that the 6 SOS appears on face value to be a 
relatively unbiased representative in this matter. In dealings with that organization, a wide 
spectrum of beliefs and opinions were voiced as to the merits of adding aviation attack assets to 
their mission. Some aggressively oppose, others aggressively support, while most seem 
viscerally aware of the possible benefits and also the potential costs. Where 6 SOS opinions are 
included in this writing, the author attempts to portrait all sides of the argument as seen from their 
eyes, but believes in the end that the breadth of their view makes them a valuably unbiased 
reference source. 
4 
FID personnel are not experts in every aircraft in the world inventory, but have 
found that a basal level of knowledge in the target airframe is enough to ensure a 
safe operating environment, and thence begin the process of instruction. 
C. THESIS 
In the first ten years of its existence the 6 SOS has grown significantly, 
and steadily increased the number and type of aviation roles performed by 
light/medium/heavy-lift helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft. But due to a 
number of issues to be discussed herein, no real expansion into “offensive 
capabilities” has occurred. This paper proposes a three-fold approach towards 
addressing the question of, should the United States aviation Foreign Internal 
Defense community acquire the capability to “advise, train and assist” foreign 
nations in the conduct of offensive related combat aviation skills? In particular, in 
this study emphasis is placed on roles and missions performed by light/fast, 
fixed-wing aircraft employing fixed-forward-firing ordinance and free-fall air-to-
ground munitions.9 Although much of the context of this discussion will be 
relevant to helicopters and/or gunships performing similar missions, the focus is 
on a Vietnam-era representative asset performing a classic Close Air Support 
(CAS) type application of airpower.10  
 
                                            
9 The terms “fixed-wing” and “rotary-wing” are used to differentiate between the more general 
terms “airplane” and “helicopter”. “Light-fast” is a broad reference to types of assets this research 
will address. Fixed-wing assets as small/slow as the commonly recognized Cessna 172 are 
considered to be at the low end of the threshold of acceptable application for this analysis 
(reasons to be discussed later), likewise modern fighters such as the F-16 Viper are generally 
above the threshold. In principle, the focus is on a Vietnam-era type asset, of which the OV-10 
Bronco, O-1 Birddog, OA-10 Warthog and Thrush Vigilante typify this author’s mental precept. 
“Fixed-forward-firing” ordinance are munitions mounted on an airframe, which are capable of 
being employed only when the nose of the aircraft is pointed at the target, such as rockets, and/or 
guns. This contrasts with side mounted, targetable weapons, such as might be found in the door 
of a helicopter (MH-60 Blackhawk) or the side of a gunship (AC-130 Spectre). Free-fall air-to-
ground munitions are weapons mounted to the airframe for the purpose of dropping from the 
aircraft and reaching their target only under the influence of gravity. Traditionally these weapons 
could only be employed in the same manner as fixed-forward-firing ordinance (pointing at the 
target), but new technologies now allow a greater variety of release parameters. 
10 Several different terms are used throughout this work to describe the type of aircraft 
intended for use as described in this study; fastmover, light-fast, Vietnam-era, and fighter to name 
a few. The intent is not to be vague or illicit confusion, but rather that each of these terms has 
potential application/meaning depending on the community which is using it. Regardless of which 
nomenclature is selected, an asset as referred to in the previous footnote is the concept to which 
this author refers. 
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This investigation will assume a tri-pronged approach: 
1. From the viewpoint of formal and informal sources, what 
capabilities does the U.S. want current and future military forces to posses, and 
how is that aligned with the capabilities of FID in general and A-FID in particular. 
2. Using four broad evidentiary sources, what indication is there that 
attack related A-FID skills are needed in regions America has interests in. The 
four sources are:  
a. Statistical evidence; garnered from foreign requests for assistance 
sent to official government agencies. 
b. Academic evidence; gathered from leading thinkers on the 
application of airpower. 
c. Anecdotal evidence; collected from individuals whose profession is 
spent among nations combating subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, and terrorism. 
d.  Real-world; observations of activities the U.S. is presently or have 
recently conducted that exemplify what FID, A-FID and Attack A-
FID (AA-FID) can or cannot contribute to U.S. strategy. 
3. If the argument is accepted that FID is an appropriate military 
application of power, and that there is a demand for attack related FID skills, 
what are the major constraints and considerations that must be taken into 
account for the implementation of this arm of US national power? 
 The FID issue is all the more relevant because of conditions in the post 
September 11th environment. American disposition to act unilaterally has the 
potential to inhibit the acceptability of future unilateral actions by the U.S. 
Additionally, the focus on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has empowered the 
U.S. to actively seek capable allies in this war. These two factors have potentially 
greatly expanded the scope of possible applications of aviation attack foreign 
internal defense (AA-FID) roles.11 Lastly, especially since 9/11, U.S. military 
 
11 FID is the generic tactic of instructing host-nations in skill sets in which they could benefit 
from instruction. A-FID is the application of FID to the aviation community. AA-FID is an unofficial 
term used in this research to include the possible spectrum of roles that assets as referred to in 
this paper might be tasked to accomplish. It includes CAS, FAC, OSC, interdiction, escort, and 
potentially other missions. When a specific mission type is intended as the reference, that specific 
mission is listed, otherwise a broader term (such as AA-FID) is used. Despite this research’s title 
“Fastmover”, the emphasis is not necessarily on jets or fighters in the classical sense; but merely 
that there is a prevalent and vital need for AA-FID missions, and a suitable focus on the types of 
aircraft that can conduct those roles is needed. 
6 
forces have numbered too few to execute the enormous number of tasks that 
need attention. FID effectively acts as a force multiplier, allowing allied nations 
assets to bolster the number for forces addressing issues the U.S. considers 
vital. 
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II. POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY 
To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our 
arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist’s 
financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global 
enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need 
our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to 
account nations that are compromised by terror, including those 
who harbor terrorists—because the allies of terror are the enemies 
of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us 
must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together 
we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn. 
- 2002 National Security Strategy12
 
A. ELEMENTS OF MODERN MILITARY POWER 
So wrote President George Bush in the introduction of the 2002 National 
Security Strategy (NSS). US goals seem broad, resolute and unambiguous; yet 
the path to achieve those means is somewhat more challenging than the words 
that characterize the ends. As stated, one of the key elements of the U.S. 
national strategy is to assist nations that join us in the fight against terror. This 
chapter will review the official doctrine as well as the academic ken relevant to 
the characteristics of U.S. forces as the America wages the current GWOT. This 
construct of features will be compared to the properties of Foreign Internal 
Defense as a strategy/tactic (and specifically aviation FID) with a goal of 
determining whether AA-FID “makes sense” as an employment technique today 
and in the future. 
 
12 United States  White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
September 2002. pp. 3-4. 
8 
                                           
B. SOURCE DOCUMENTS  
1. Strategy 
a. National Security Strategy 
The highest level of guidance for formulating military doctrine and 
intent for the U.S. as a whole is the National Security Strategy. As of this writing, 
the latest version of that document is the 2002 publication. The purpose of the 
NSS is to provide overarching guidance for the various tools of statecraft that 
execute the elements of the Commander in Chief drafted document. In light of 
the events of September 11, 2001, the September 2002 NSS emphasizes a 
different focus and capability than previous versions. The NSS consists of eight 
overarching goals, five of which directly and/or indirectly address issues related 
to the military and foreign relations. Those five goals and their key concerns 
include:13
1. “Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to 
prevent attacks against us and our friends” 
• Build coalitions and regional organizations to fight 
terrorism.  
• Encourage allies and partners to organize to fight 
domestic terrorism 
• Provide military, law enforcement, political and 
financial tools to assistance states that fight terrorism 
• Identify and destroy threats before they reach U.S. 
borders. 
• Work with States to de-legitimatize acts of terror. 
• Support moderate and modern governments.  
2.  “Work with others to diffuse regional conflicts” 
• “Develop agendas for cooperative action with other 
main centers of global power” 
• Understand when States are incapable of fighting the 
GWOT.  
3. “Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies and our 
friends with weapons of mass destruction” 
• Strengthen alliances and the establishment of new 
partners, even with former adversaries. 
 
13 United States  White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America., 
September 2002. pp 8-16. 
9 
• Develop and pursue innovative use of military forces.  
• Focus U.S. actions to those which clearly combat 
identified threats.  
4. “Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main 
centers of global power”. 
• Ensure that America’s closest alliances (NATO is 
given as the relevant example) have appropriate 
combat contributions to make coalition warfare.  
• Use the power of the American economic and 
defense industry to transform allied military powers 
(again, NATO is the specific reference). 
• Build and nurture the capability to fight together with 
U.S. allies. 
5. “Transform America’s national security institutions to meet 
the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century”. 
• Develop temporary access arrangements for the 
deployment of U.S. Forces. 
• Strengthen joint operations 
• Conduct operations in a fiscally responsible manner. 
• Provide the Commander in Chief a “wider range of 
military options”. 
• Ensure the Department of State (DoS) has the 
necessary funding to ensure the success of 
diplomatic efforts. 
• Develop diplomats with broader a basis of 
international issues and subject matters. 
• Recognize the increased interconnectivity between 
domestic and international affairs.  
 
b. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism became a 
significantly more focal document in the wake of the September 11th World Trade 
Center bombing. The current edition (February, 2003) provides focus for the 
powers of the state, with regards to the increasingly prominent threat of terrorism. 
This has driven the spotlight towards a greater “international actor” mindset. 
Again quoting the Commander in Chief, 
10 
                                           
The struggle against international terrorism is different from any 
other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily 
through military might. We must fight terrorist networks, and all 
those who support their efforts to spread fear around the world, 
using every instrument of national power – diplomatic, economic 
law enforcement, financial, information intelligence, and military.”14 
The document devotes significant time addressing domestic concerns, but then 
substantial guidance is rendered with regards to the military and foreign relations 
on a number of issues:15
• Application of military strength is not the universal 
application to fight the war on terror. 
• The U.S. must find applications for the indirect use of 
the powers of state.  
• The quest to preserve American security must be done at 
home and abroad. 
• U.S. focus should be on “identifying and diffusing threats 
before they reach American borders.”  
• The greater the diversity and persistency of attacks against 
terror organizations, the greater will be the successes. 
• The capability must be achieved and maintained to execute 
“global reach” in the ability to fight the GWOT. 
• Continue to foster the old, but also create new alliances to 
combat terrorists. 
• We must, “rely upon and assist other states to eradicate 
terrorism at its root”. 
• “Where states are weak but willing, we will support 
them vigorously in their efforts to build the institutions 
and capabilities needed to exercise authority over all 
their territory and fight terrorism where it exists.” 
• “Train foreign governments in tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to combat terrorism”. 
• Terrorists will gravitate towards states that lack the capability 
to effectively combat them. Such states exist in all regions of 
the world. 
 
14 United States  White House. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February 2003. p 
1. 
15 United States  White House. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February,2003. 
pp 1-21. 
11 
                                           
• It will be beneficial to build coalitions and regional 
organizations to fight terrorism.  
 
c. Homeland Security Strategy 
The Homeland Security Strategy is a new document drafted in the 
aftermath of the September 11th World Trade Center bombings. This first edition 
(July, 2002) provides focus for the powers of the state as well as the populace, 
with regards to the newly prominent threat of terrorism. Although the document is 
predominately aimed at domestic concerns, military related concerns and foreign 
relations are discussed where appropriate:16
• Government spending must be constrained where able. 
• Homeland security is not just a domestic issue; the nature of 
modern terrorism requires a global approach to prevention. 
• Terrorist’s networks are increasingly more sophisticated. 
• Unstable regions create environments conducive to 
terrorist’s organizations. 
• The Department of Defense (DoD) contributes to homeland 
security through overseas military operations. 
• The U.S. must work with traditional allies and new partners 
to effectively combat terrorism. 
• Multilateral, bilateral and new coordination mechanisms are 
required to execute this strategy. 
• The U.S. will provide foreign nations with “specialized 
training and assistance to help build their capacities to 
combat terrorism. Some of these programs are military in 
nature…[including] the provision of equipment for enhancing 
border security and customs capabilities.”  
 
2. Doctrine 
a. United States Special Operations Command Posture 
Statement 
Like the previously referenced documents, the United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Posture Statement provides broad 
based guidance on the organization and operation of Special Operations Forces 
 
16 United States Office of Homeland Security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. July, 
2002. p. 60. 
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(SOF). Because this level of guidance is getting farther from the policy level, and 
closer to the execution level, the emphasis shifts from “what needs to be done” to 
“how it needs to be done.” Nevertheless, there are several broad references 
applicable to this discussion. SOF must: 17
• Have the skills to operate in environments with higher 
physical and political risk. 
• Be able to act in concert with conventional forces, and in 
autonomy from friendly support structures. 
• Be specially selected, trained and organized to execute their 
unique mission. 
• Exhibit exceptional maturity, initiative, education and 
experience. 
• Use presence to assure allies and friends of U.S. 
government resolve. 
• Provide a wider array of options to political leadership. 
• “Facilitate the development of indigenous capabilities to fight 
against terrorists and rogue regimes.” 
 
b. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 
Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine (AFDD-1) 
is the principle document for providing the Air Force its focus. The concepts are 
built on the framework established by the National Security Strategy, and identify 
four points salient to this discussion: 18
• Effects not platforms are the focus of operations. 
• It is the right force, not equal shares of the force that should 
be tasked to an operation.  
• The nine Clauswitzian principles of war (unity of command, 
objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, 
security, surprise, and simplicity) are valuable constructs for 
understanding and utilizing airpower. 
 
17 United States Special Operations Command. United States Special Operations Forces 
Posture Statement 2003-2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism. 
pp. 7-29. 
18 United States Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 17 
November 2003. 
13 
• The seven tenets of air and space power (centralized control 
and decentralized execution, flexibility and versatility, 
synergistic effects persistence, concentration, priority, and 
balance) are unique features of operating in the 3rd 
dimension, and must be considered in operations. 
Although AFDD-1 is an Air Force generic document, it also 
addresses several points specific for Special Operations: 
• Special Operations can function at the strategic, operational 
and tactical level or warfare. 
• Special Operations must be able to function in situations with 
high political, environmental and operational constraints.  
 
3. Academic Findings 
There is a significant and continuously expanding body of knowledge that 
discusses how the academic community believes the military should be trained, 
organized and equipped, especially in light of the events of 9/11. Unlike the 
previous section, the credible and relevant source data from academia includes 
some material slightly more dated. This thesis will emphasize material from 
prominent sources (such as government agencies and respected academic 
institutions), of recent release (particularly post-Gulf War I for airpower related 
issues and post 9/11 for modern force structure and GWOT concerns), and those 
that focus on issues specifically relevant to this research. As in the previous 
section, the discussion will roughly follow a “big to small”, “strategy to tactics” 
approach. 
A preponderance of the academic material accentuates three questions. 
What external pressures place demands on the U.S.? What internal pressures 
place demands on the U.S.? And what force structure related constraints drive 
appropriate capabilities? 
a. External Pressures 
Several prominent and recurring themes appear throughout 
academia with regards to what exogenous influences are affecting the shape of  
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the military today. The major themes include; the ascendancy of “small wars,” 
technology and weapons proliferation among enemies, and the rise of modern 
terrorism. 
“Small wars” have gone by, and continue to be called many 
different names; Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), guerrilla wars, and Military 
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) to name just a few. Aside from the 
nuances and political pressures that determine when it is appropriate and vogue 
to use one term over another, most are in agreement that these types of conflicts 
have been and will continue to be, a major influence in the world. The RAND 
Corporation noted that these operations have moved from “sideshow to center 
stage”, and determined that the Army and Air Force had experienced a two to 
three-fold increase in such operations since the conclusion of the cold war.19 And 
although RAND observed that the DoD has traditionally argued that the LIC 
environment is a subset of more conventional operations, RAND believes they 
are qualitatively different from traditional combat roles, and the “military can no 
longer ignore the fundamental issues they raise.”20
Related to the issue of guerrilla warfare and insurgencies, the 
RAND Corporation conducted another study attempting to characterize the “how 
and where” of future conflict. Their analysis is synopsized in the following chart 
which depicts “regime control over territory and populace” on the Y-axis and 
“regime’s attitude toward terrorist groups” on the X-axis. In short, states with 




19 “From Sideshow to Center Stage: Military Operations Other Than War”. Rand Review,  
Fall, 1997. p. 1. This page reference is from the Rand Review of the full Rand article by , Jennifer 
M. Taw, and Alan Vick. "From Sideshow to Center Stage: The Role of the Army and Air Force in 
Military Operations Other Than War," Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning 
for the 21st Century. Fall 1997. 
20 “From Sideshow to Center Stage: Military Operations Other Than War”. Rand Review,  
Fall, 1997. p. 1. This page reference is from the Rand Review of the full Rand article by , Jennifer 
M. Taw, and Alan Vick. "From Sideshow to Center Stage: The Role of the Army and Air Force in 
Military Operations Other Than War," Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning 
for the 21st Century. Fall 1997. 
of military force. Whereas “weak” states, depending on their view of inhabiting 
terror networks, are predisposed toward a wide range of military related activities 
for resolving the situation.  
 
Figure 1.   Military Options in Various State Types (RAND)21  
 
“The projections of both liberal and conservative pundits and 
prognosticators seem to show the Global War on Terrorism to be headed for 10 
to 15 year duration.”22 RAND argues that “…newly important military tasks stem 
from the increased likelihood of significant operations in fundamentally weak 
states,” specifically including state and security assistance roles such as; 
combined military operations, military advisors, training, military to military 
contacts, and humanitarian operations. 23 This study also suggests that the Air 
Force should expect a “heightened demand for military coalition support activities 
(e.g., military-to-military contacts, training, education, and exercises) and an 
increase in overseas temporary deployments for USAF personnel with language 
and diplomatic skills.”24
                                            
21 Edward Harshberger. “Global Implications for the U.S. Air Force”. Rand Review. Summer 
2002. p 1. 
22 Timothy L. Hale. “Building Future Success: Developing a Total Force Template for Air 
Force Special Operations Command”. p 17. 
23 Edward Harshberger. “Global Implications for the U.S. Air Force”. Rand Review. Summer 
2002. p 1. 
24 Edward Harshberger. “Global Implications for the U.S. Air Force”. Rand Review. Summer 
2002. p 2. 
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Even if the U.S. were to move towards a more nationalist or 
isolationist focused foreign policy, it has been suggested that MOOTW will 
remain a mainstay of U.S. activities. “All indicators suggest that MOOTW directed 
at narrower, national goals, (e.g., counterproliferation, counterterrorism, 
noncombatant evacuation operations, and counterdrug proliferations) are likely to 
continue under any conceivable national security policy.”25 If that is the “low end” 
of U.S. participation in world politics, American reaction to the events of 9/11 
suggest that for at least the foreseeable future MOOTW and anti-terror type 
actions by the U.S. will exist at a level significantly higher than the minimalist 
scenario described above. 
In Defeating Insurgents with Technology, Colonel Jeffery Barnett 
investigated the nature of modern warfare and concluded that from the U.S. 
standpoint, it seemed to be characterized by two themes: technological 
dependence and the rise of insurgencies. With regards to the second, he 
suggests, “Although conventional aggression (such as the Korean War and the 
Gulf War) will continue to threaten U.S. interests, insurgencies will probably 
persist as the most likely form of conflict in which U.S. military forces may be 
called upon to fight.”26  
In some fashion, terrorism has become the modern subset of the 
“small wars, insurgencies and revolutions” discussion. Since the events of 
September 11th, the National Security Strategy has come to revolve around 
terrorism as the major threat. Publication of the doctrinal documents discussed 
above are evidence of the strategic recognition of the importance and impact of 
terrorism as the “poor man’s weapon” having risen as a mainstream combat 
technique.27 Compounding the difficulty in fighting these smaller wars and terror 
 
25 Alan Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, John Stillion. “Preparing the U.S. Air 
Force for Military Operations Other Than War”, Rand, 1997. p 3.  
26 Jeffery R. Barnett. “Defeating Insurgents with Technology”. Airpower Journal. Summer 
1996.  p 1.  
27 Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer. Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security 
Environment. 2002. p ix-xii. 
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based actions is the ease with which the opposition forces are acquiring better 
technical infrastructure, especially weapons and communications. 
All of these concerns collectively draft a picture of a turbulent world 
characterized by small conflicts in which America will have a vested interest to 
participate. Additionally, evidence suggests that these small wars posses the 
potential to be more difficult challenges than in the past. 
b. Internal Pressures 
The previous section focused on the forces that place pressure on 
the U.S. from outside the nation, but constraints are not confined to those 
generated exogenously. In this era of heated politics, talk of a new world order, 
the perceived polarization of the American populace and a rising national debt, 
some constraints are generated within.  
The political wherewithal to respond to a situation with the use of 
military forces is no small endeavor. The “military option” can be leveraged by 
increasing the breadth and variety of military responses. In the future the U.S. 
should expect that the palette of choices is more diverse than a conventional 
“Normandy” or super secret “Desert One”. Indeed, the repertoire of military 
applications is broad, but the demands of a new threat in a new era challenge the 
U.S. to understand the enemy and adapt options to confront the threat. The 
source of the pressure to develop a palette of choices is the customer (civilian 
and military leadership) to whom America is challenged to provide innovative and 
cost effective options for the GWOT.28
Thinking about participating in small wars by assisting, integrating 
with host forces, or intervening leads to knotty questions on 
national will, political guidance to the military, and the military's 
ability to act as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in situations 
short of declared war. These questions lead, in turn, to others 
regarding specific military capabilities. Do we have the proper 
equipment, doctrine, tactics, training, and personnel selection by 
the services? Are we ready to provide a series of military options to 
political decision makers in situations short of war?29
 
28 NSS, NCST, and USSOC Posture Statement. 
29 David J. Dean. :The USAF in LIC: Air University: Maxwell AFB, Oct 1986. p. 2. 
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So as the U.S. continues to define its role in the world and exercise 
its foreign policy, high value is placed on developing new and innovative 
approaches to problem solving. Military capabilities outside of traditional “force-
on-force” applications effectively expand the political diversity by which the 
POLMIL (Political and Military) system, can negotiate the political battlespace. An 
increased breadth of military responses also opens the door for options that may 
be more palatable to the American populace or agreeable to the international 
community.  
But as with any resource limited system, there are disparities 
between what is wanted and what is possessed. Notably, the differences are 
often a manifestation of budgetary constraints. A report of the National Defense 
Panel noted, “Defense enters this era of geopolitical and military technical 
transformation within an environment of declining resources. And what the U.S. 
does today shapes the capability twenty years down the road.”30 The panel 
further noted the powerful synergy possible by “fiscal burden-sharing” which can 
be used to “help promote efficiencies in an era of constrained defense 
budgets.”31 Although the catastrophic events at the World Trade Centers have 
created a fiscal and willpower windfall, it would be folly to assume that such an 
abundance of resources will last for long. 
Internal pressures force America’s hand to consider and develop 
expanded tools of statecraft, especially in regards to ways in which the U.S. can 
fight the GWOT.  As the U.S. pursues these paths, monetary limitations must be 
considered. Ideally these two influences would drive a politically and militarily 
diverse organization that can operate at a relatively low cost. Such an 
organization would be said to be of “value added”. Although many pretenders 
may attempt to fulfill this role, only time can conclusively show that any particular 
piece of equipment, specific tactic, or military organization can meet the long 
term objectives of inexpensive and effective. 
 
30 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p 1. 
31 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p 5. 
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c. Force Structure 
Commensurate with the academic findings regarding external and 
internal pressures that shape the modern military, they are accompanied by 
general recommendations designed to tailor forces to the correct focus. 
Most prominently discussed among future requirements is the need 
for the U.S. to embrace combined operations. The U.S. must not be confined to 
merely conducting operations hand-in-hand with allies (such as the U.S. 
relationship with the United Kingdom in Desert Storm I and II), but also in new 
and innovative relationships. In the wake of the cold war, the National Defense 
Panel conducted a study designed to characterize the nature of military 
operations in the 21st century.  They concluded that many modern, emerging 
challenges do not respect national boundaries and therefore will require 
international cooperation to resolve. Thus, one of their major findings was to 
emphasize a “much greater role of jointness”, and a “review of how we approach 
and incorporate our allies”, as well as recognition that “international operations 
are becoming the norm for our defense industry”.32
Particularly applicable to this discussion, they also recommended 
the following broad sweeping guidance: 
As the formal alliance structures of the past evolve, our ability to 
operate with formal allies or ad hoc coalition partners, or to 
cooperate with nongovernmental or international organizations, will 
depend increasingly on professional relationships at all levels. To 
develop these relationships, we must create more opportunities for 
our military forces to work with allies and potential coalition partners 
before crisis develop. As we consider the changing character of 
alliances in the future, we must not lose sight of their purpose: they 
must improve not only our security, but also the security of our 
allies. It cannot be a one-sided relationship.33
 There is a ubiquitous amount of concurrence on this issue; 
 
32 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. pp 1-5. 
33 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p. 5. 
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•  “Communication and other interoperability requirements may 
become increasingly difficult, even while coalitions operations 
become more prevalent. The U.S. military will have to seek new 
avenues for interoperability training with an increasing number 
of actual and potential allies.” 34 
• …”yet to take advantage of new technologies and the 
contributions that…our allies and friends around the world, can 
make to national security.” 35 
• “But the strategic environment also requires the capability to 
help other countries fight and win their own wars.” 36 
• “strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, building 
cooperative partnerships with the other major powers…working 
with other nations to diffuse regional conflicts, and preventing 
our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction.” And “…pursuing regional 
stability through funding military aid programs and training…”37  
A second issue relating to force structure is how “new technologies 
have diminished the importance of geographic distance but increased the 
importance of time—and consequently the ability to respond quickly to emerging 
problems.”38 Technology has facilitated the ability for both allies and enemies to 
project power, but traditional power sources (armies) are still comparatively slow 
to deploy and employ. Although the U.S. will always maintain a capability to 
project conventional forces, an array of military related options that can be 
enacted quickly could do much to augment national power. 
Activities such as the Base Realignment and Closure Committee 
(BRAC) which recommends a number of U.S. military locations to close each 
time it meets, as well as the realignment of infrastructure in Korea, and the slow 
erosion of forward U.S. military presence in such areas as Europe, are all 
contributory to the trend of decreased dispersion of U.S. military forces in 
 
34 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p. 5. 
35 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p. 4. 
36 Norman J. Brozenick Jr. “Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations.” 
Jun. 2002. p vi. 
37 Marc Grossman. “U.S. Military Commitments and Ongoing Military Operations Abroad”. 
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 9 September 2003. 
38 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p 1. 
21 
                                           
general. The consolidation of bases and troops only exacerbates the need for the 
current military force structure to maintain relevant skill sets and posses the 
ability to rapidly project that capability over long ranges, with little notice, and in 
quick order. 
d. David Dean: The Air Force Role in LIC 
David Dean in The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict, tackles 
all three prior subjects together, and attempts to address the issue of how US 
military forces need to be organized to effectively implement national policy. His 
focus is partially driven by the post Cold War mindset that third world countries 
will be future hotspots, and a “combination of factors will make LIC a very likely 
phenomenon in the years ahead”.39 From this vantage, Dean suggests that 
America focus on the third world in general and low intensity conflicts specifically; 
from there he builds a case for what he sees as the benefits of a FID oriented 
posture. 
Are the military components as instruments of national policy able 
to act effectively in the third world? If not, what needs to be done? 
The USAF (and the other services) needs to consider the question 
of effective assistance to third world countries as part of a basic 
shift in strategic thinking. Our primary strategic planning effort has 
been to insert large numbers of U.S. ground and air forces into an 
area such as the Persian Gulf to accomplish our policy objectives. 
That planning effort must continue, but with the understanding that 
inserting a major U.S. force in any third world region is extremely 
unlikely, both for domestic political reasons and because potential 
host nations are reluctant to support large U.S. forces. Our primary 
strategic focus for planning needs to shift to providing effective 
leverage for third world friends and allies. That leverage can be in 
the form of arms sales, training, doctrine, or even small special 
forces. But providing leverage depends on effective planning that 
builds the data base which allows us to pinpoint the host country’s 
needs and capabilities. Developing that kind of expertise in the 
U.S.A., and in the other services, will be a difficult and frustrating 
long-term proposition. The AF must recognize the need for a 





39 David Dean Jr. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986. p 13. 
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military influence in the third world may not be a glamorous task, 
but it will be the name of the game for the next twenty years and 
beyond.40
Dean emphasizes that the effectiveness of the military in the 
evolving shape of international relations is shifting towards the importance of the 
projection of power without necessarily resorting to hostilities, along with a much 
closer working relationship with a broader range of newly defined allies. “The 
U.S. should have forces designed to show resolve without engaging in combat, 
to accomplish specialized operations such as the Son Tay raid, and to assist 
friendly countries facing threats to their internal security by providing advisory 
assistance, cadre, and ultimately, U.S. combat units that can be integrated with 
those of the host nation.” 41
Dean’s suggests three pillars the U.S. will need to focus on, in 
order to empower these capabilities: 42
• The U.S. needs a deeper understanding of the third world, 
specifically their military capabilities, environments and 
limiting factors. 
• Training, education, assistance and the transfer of 
capabilities need to be tailored to meet the host nation’s 
needs, not merely a reproduction of U.S. structures and 
methods. 
• To accomplish this, specific “packages” of need to be 
built for the effective transfer of capabilities. 
• The force executing the transfer must be specially 
trained in the role (linguistically, culturally, and 
professionally). 
• The U.S. must have a rapid response capability to aid allies. 
To execute this properly, the above two bullets must be true 
first. 
To this end the Transforming Defense study suggested, “greater 
emphasis should be placed on experimenting with a variety of military systems, 
operational concepts and force structures. The goal would be to identify those 
 
40 David Dean Jr. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986. p. xiii. 
41 David Dean Jr. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986. p 4. 
42 David Dean Jr. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986. pp 76-77. 
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that are capable of solving the challenges that emerge or that are capable of 
exploiting opportunities—our asymmetric advantage—and to eliminate those 
which are not.” 43
4. Miscellaneous Directives 
Several other documents that fall in the hierarchy of doctrinal information 
were also reviewed, and found to mirror the above findings, or have no significant 
additional information to contribute as relates to this topic. Some of those 
sources include: Air Force Doctrine Document 2 Organization and Employment 
of Aerospace Power, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3 Military Operations Other 
Than War, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7 Special Operations, and Joint 
Publication 3-7, Military Operations Other Than War 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Presented here is a consolidation of the features discussed previously. 
The list provided is not inclusive of all of the factors previously identified in the 
literature; rather it attempts to condense the comprehensive list to a serious of 
overarching categories that encapsulate the spirit and intent of the full listing. The 
list is also not contextually rich, but a catch-phrase or snap-shot of what U.S. 
policy, DoD doctrine, and leading academics perceive as the key issues with 
regards to how the military’s needs must be focused in the years to come. This 
guidance includes: 
1. Strengthen alliances 
2. Innovate - increase the array of military options 
3. Operate with fiscal responsibility 
4. Engage/defeat threats before they reach us 
5. Expect more “small wars”, to include insurgencies and terrorism 
6. Expect the enemy to have greater technological capabilities 
7. Emphasize jointness44
 
43 National Defense Panel. “Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century 
Report of the National Defense Panel”. December 1997. p 1. 
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8. Respond quickly 
9. Maintain and retain an “off the shelf” capability 
Many of these “military necessities” are easy to pin on the realities/needs 
of a Global War on Terrorism-oriented forces structure. Emerging and persistent 
operational requirements suggest that although some of these factors may be 
more in the spotlight as of late, they are more generically indicative of sweeping 
changes in the nature of war and politics. In 1991, Major Moulton summarized 
this tendency in his analysis of competing trends in the nature of warfare: 
Current trends in the international political arena, combined with 
fiscal constraints at home, are pointing towards a significant change 
in U.S. defense policy. With the drawdown of conventional forces 
and forward deployed units, U.S. defense interests abroad will 
increasingly rely on the armed forces of other nations. As witnessed 
in the recent Persian Gulf crisis, maintenance of vital U.S. strategic 
interest hinges upon the development of social, economic, political, 
and military institutions favorable to our foreign policy objectives.45
Thus if Major Moulton’s argument is to be followed, the circumstances 
created by events such as 9/11 are merely indicative of the types of changes the 
modern world is experiencing. Even though the current war on terror may be 
taken as a singular case point for the importance of leaner, more effective, less 
conventional type operations, this type of focus is a founded overarching 
approach to future political successes using the military as a tool of statecraft.  
 
 
44 Joint Publication 1-02 defines Joint as “Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., 
in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.” And Combined as, 
“Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies.” But those terms are used 
somewhat interchangeably in this discussion. FID by definition is Combined, and although the 
skills being taught to the host nation are aviation specific, they are normatively intended to be 
used to support other host nation services, i.e. joint. So even though U.S. doctrine emphasizes 
joint, FID automatically makes it combined, thus the joint label when used here is intended to 
imply both joint and combined. 
45 John R. Moulton. Role of the Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense. 
Sep. 1991. p ix. 
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III. CHARACTERISTICS OF FID 
Many of the weapons and methods employed today by U.S. armed 
forces can be used against non-state actors. Some, however, are 
more directly applicable than others. U.S. experience in conducting 
Close Air Support (CAS), employing Special Operations Forces 
(SOF), and advising friendly governments in using aviation to 
defend themselves from insurgents and terrorists may form a basis 
for building capabilities against non-state actors. 
- Christopher Bolkom and Kenneth Katzman46
A. INTRO 
Having investigated and characterized what the civilian and military 
leaders expect out of the application of U.S. military forces, it is now possible to 
compare and contrast those expectations to the actual/expected characteristics 
of foreign internal defense. The academic marriage of the list of desired 
capabilities to the doctrinal, academic, and operational features of FID should 
allow a broad reaching characterization as to whether FID generically, and AA-
FID specifically, “makes sense” as a strategy and tactic. 
1. FID and Aviation FID 
Below are each of the nine “key features” identified in Chapter 2, as well 
as discussion relating how FID and aviation FID contribute to meeting those 
ends. 
a. Strengthen Alliances 
Efforts devoted to strengthening alliances come in several different 
“flavors” and for a multitude of different purposes. One of the prime reasons for 
working with U.S. allies is in the quelling of troublesome international trends 
before they reach American shores. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1 Foreign 
Internal Defense specifically notes aviation FID’s role in this as, “Air Force FID 
operations can help improve host nation air force contributions to peacetime 
stability and development, help prevent an outbreak of violence during the early 
 
46 Christopher Bolkom, and Kenneth Katzman,. “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for 
Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. 24, Jan. 2005. 
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stages of an internal confrontation in the host state and help prevent the 
establishment of terror organizations in the host nation.”47  
Increasingly, conflict resolution in the world is approached 
multilaterally. Thus aiding allies prepares and creates a more capable allied force 
when operations occur, but also “multinational participation lays the groundwork 
for future contacts between U.S. and host nation personnel by establishing 
mutual understanding of FID-IDAD requirements and objectives.”48 Similarly both 
gain a better understanding of how nations operate, so that future events can be 
conducted with greater connectivity and efficiency. According to Dean, 
Working with foreign air forces enables the U.S. Air Force to gain 
tremendous insight into the capabilities, limitations, and potential of 
those air forces. This arrangement provides the essential 
knowledge needed to establish meaningful assistance programs 
that result in the appropriate growth of the host nation’s air arm. 
Additionally, by working in an environment that could become a 
low-intensity battlefield at some point, the Air Force personnel 
involved in the training would gain knowledge invaluable should the 
United States need to intervene. Developing true interrelationships 
between the U.S. Air Force and other air forces has the potential of 
increasing the political stability of a region and increasing U.S. 
access to the region, and could even result in gaining a U.S. proxy 
there.49
This is one of the rarely recognized force enhancing features of 
utilizing FID. While Combat Aviation Advisor teams are downrange in the host 
nation, they spend anywhere from less than a week to several months working 
directly with a whole range of individuals; from U.S. embassy and DoS 
personnel, to host nation elected officials and junior military enlisted soldiers. 
This breadth and depth of contact builds inroads that can be exploited in a variety 
of manners: 
 
47 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p 3. 
48 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p 42. 
49 David J. Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict.” 1986. p 78. 
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• Developing personnel with practical knowledge of 
procedures and probable obstacles to deploying to 
remote/politically challenging locations. 
• Building professional and personal relationships that 
facilitate U.S.-host nation cooperation. 
• Developing personnel with a solid understanding of specific 
operational features of friends and allies. 
• Practical experience of personnel working in real-world 
tactical situations. 
The fruitful products of these types of operations manifest 
themselves frequently, and are captured in the sentiment of AF FID doctrine, 
“Time and time gain, anti-access dilemmas have been overcome through bonds 
of trust forged between advisors and foreign military leaders.”50
b. Innovate - Increase the Array of Military Options 
In the modern construct, Foreign Internal Defense is innovative 
unto itself, as it brings capabilities to the table not previously possible. Recently, 
FID has demonstrated the unique breadth of options that unfold when savvy and 
forward thinking personalities are aware of what FID can do. Aviation FID 
activities conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom are not available as open source. But interviews with 6 SOS personnel 
suggest that one day history will reveal the novel, unique, and “attainable by no 
other reasonable mechanism” contributions that A-FID made to those conflicts.51 
Even within the concept of foreign internal defense are numerous tactical, 
operational, strategic and political levels at which a strategy may be 
implemented. For A-FID, the major categories of interaction include; the transfer 
of defense articles and services, assessments of foreign military aviation 
capabilities, training foreign military forces, providing advice for military forces 
and government agencies, assisting aviation forces in executing specific 
 
50 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. 3. 
51 Various members of the 6 SOS contributed a number of anecdotal stories concerning 
aviation FID personnel, especially in Afghanistan. 
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missions or contingency operations, facilitating the integration of multinational 
operations, and providing direct support to host countries.52  
In addition to the variety in types of operations that can be 
performed, there is also a spectrum of participation.  
Thus in LIC U.S. policy makers can use military forces to 
accomplish political objectives without using massive resources, 
and can do so at a controllable level of escalation….U.S. forces 
would likely be assisting friendly countries rather than managing the 
conflict unilaterally. Should a small war escalate to a level where 
larger U.S. forces were involved, the objectives and management 
of the conflict could shift the level to the intervention level, and an 
expanded U.S. effort to control the war rather than merely assisting 
a friend would be expected.53
Lastly, FID is unique in that is one of a very few ways in which to 
achieve military objectives without engaging in actual combat activities and/or 
conducting covert operations. In a time of peace with no American soldier facing 
combat related risks, political to political negotiation along with the appropriate 
expenditure of funds, and the deployment of a FID team can result in the 
definitive attainment of a specific military objective. Few options currently 
available to political or military leaders can make such a claim, or provide such a 
result. 
c. Operate with Fiscal Responsibility  
Military monetary mindedness is contemporarily relevant for 
reasons as recently reported by Oxford Analytica; “ [President Bush] substantially 
increased US foreign aid budgets, and launched several major new initiatives” 
but “working within stretched budgets will be a consistent theme in US aid 
programmes [sic]”.54 But there are several ways in which FID can contribute to 
minimizing the fiscal significance of military expenditures. First, the expenses 
associated with garrison operations of an aviation FID organization are less than 
 
52 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. pp 3-5. 
53 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. pp 7-8. 
54 Oxford Analytica. “United States: Tight Budget Constrains Foreign Aid”. January 05 2005.  
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that of maintaining the corresponding breadth of indigenous capability. Currently 
one FID squadron teaches dozens of operational skills to dozens of countries, 
with only several aircraft on the ramp and a comparatively small, several-million 
dollar budget.55 To autonomously conduct the same breadth of operations 
outside of the FID construct would essentially required a separate organization 
for each of the major skill sets that the 6 SOS teaches.56 Second, when tactically 
effective, a very small number of advisors can accomplish what would take an 
entire flying squadron to accomplish elsewhere; thus fewer numbers of forces are 
required to effect change. Third, Air Force Doctrine measures FID effectiveness 
on pseudo-fiscal criteria; “ultimately, FID efforts are successful if they preclude 
the need to deploy large numbers of U.S. military personnel and equipment”.57 
Obviously this success criteria embodies several other strategic and tactical 
issues (small force structure, fewer American lives at risk, small deployments, 
etc.), but even those concepts embody a monetarily constrained mindset. 
Economically, these translate into an opportunity cost. Not only do the fiscally 
conservative operations of a FID endeavor act monetarily responsible, but what 
you don’t have to do by using a mechanism such as FID constitutes a savings as 
well. 
Similarly new concepts of operations can be “experimented” with at 
the FID level for much less than other comparative military operations. For 
example, what if it was determined that the Straits of Malacca should be patrolled 
and controlled by helicopter borne teams to combat piracy? For the U.S. to 
achieve this capability, it would have to train crews to those mission elements 
(assuming they did not already posses them), possibly retrofit/modify the aircraft 
to support the tasks, then deploy the nearest assets (or the most appropriate 
 
55 SMSgt Hale Laughlin, 6 SOS, Personal interview, 27 January 2005. 
56 But this is not to imply that FID trained host nation assets can achieve the same results of 
U.S. forces autonomously performing the same role. What the 6 SOS can teach the 
Kazakhstani’s to do in aging AN-2 Colts is minor compared to what a US Special Operations MC-
130 squadron could accomplish if deployed to Kazakhstan to conduct the operation on its own. 
But that loss in capability by using host nation assets is replaced by the 6th’s ability to conduct a 
greater diversity of training and at a reduced cost. 
57 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p 2. 
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asset, possibly from the U.S.) to Singapore (or Indonesia or whatever nation 
America had agreed would support said activities), then pay all the requisite 
monies associated with maintaining the aircrews, maintenance and support 
personnel at the deployed location, until such time as the efficacy of the 
operation could be assessed.  
For an aviation FID squadron to accomplish the same result, they 
would only need to train 2-6 personnel (pilot, crew chief, maintenance) in the skill 
sets, then send them to the host nation to modify their aircraft (if required) and 
then teach the locals how to perform the skills; meanwhile only having to support 
a small footprint of downrange personnel while the new tactic was evaluated.  
Depending on a whole range of issues, the time required to execute 
either of these two approaches could go in favor of either option, and certainly 
there are a wealth of other issues to consider in such a situation: is U.S. 
presence desired at the target location, are assets available to deploy, and is it 
desired that the host nation posses the capability being discussed? The costs 
required to “test” this capability would certainly be lower for the FID-addressed 
option.58
Lastly, Arnold Abraham suggests that the U.S. should shift monies 
towards programs with higher payoffs, and “our ability to sway hearts and minds 
could be complimented with billions of dollars more in foreign economic and 
military aid.”59 Since FID can be such a significant cost savings over traditional 
conventional approaches, FID can then be an additional cost savings tool to 
enhance the effectiveness of the military aid provided in-line with Abraham’s  
58 This argument ignores potential “other costs” the FID approach could incur. Later in this 
discussion, the merits of supporting the host nation across the breadth of FID operations will be 
addressed. In preview, the author suggests that if this is a capability that the U.S. strongly desired 
that the host nation possess, and there are doubts if the host nation will be able to sustain the 
capability once the U.S. has departed, then it is essential that the appropriate support 
mechanisms/structures, including funds be incorporated into the training plan. For this example, 
this might entail the U.S. giving the host nation 2 helicopters to execute this mission, which could 
significantly increase the costs of the FID approach. But, if this fictional night illumination of boats 
tactic were to remain in effect for the long run, even these expensive up-front costs of the FID 
approach would rapidly become secondary to the extended costs of a long-term duration U.S. 
deployment of troops and assets. 
59 Arnold J. Abraham, “Examining Changes in the Character and Conduct of War as a Basis 
for a SOF-Centric Strategy.” 2004. 
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suggestion. This is not to imply that this approach would work in every scenario, 
but rather the unique nature of FID (and its commensurate lower operating costs) 
can facilitate fresh approaches to problem solving, especially in the fiscal sense. 
d. Engage/defeat Threats Before They Reach the U.S. 
Eluded to in the “Strengthen Alliances” section, engaging/defeating 
threats before they reach the U.S. could be a sub-category of that discussion. 
But since the events of September 11th, there has been a subtle shift in policy 
which seems to emphasize that engaging and defeating threats, before they 
arise in America, is less synonymous with strengthening alliances and more 
about national protection. 
Nevertheless, that subtle shift in policy has also had political 
consequences which have served to magnify the possible benefits of alternative 
ways to engage and defeat threats beyond U.S. shores. Unilateral or globally un-
favorable actions place stress on political leaders that may diminish their 
capability to utilize similar force mechanisms in the future. FID is an alternative, 
and can be used to “build up a local capability [in the host nation] to solve the 
problem without massive commitment of US troops and the potential loss of life 
that direct combat would bring”.60 In the long run, the application of FID is a cost-
benefit analysis conducted on the tactical, strategic, political, fiscal, and security 
level, with the resultant opinion that, “the United States views advisory operations 
as a cost effective means of assisting friendly nations to deal with internal 
problems before they assume global dimensions and require large-scale 
introduction of U.S. combat forces.”61
e. Expect Increased U.S. Involvement in LIC 
If the relevancy of small wars is on the rise as discussed in the 
“External Pressures” section, then America will need effective strategies and 
tactics to deal with those scenarios. Given political and monetary pressures, a 
 
60 William T. Eliason. “USAF Support to Low Intensity Conflict: Three Case Studies from the 
1980s.” June 1994. p 5. 
61 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p 3. 
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means is needed to effectively and efficiently deal with the low intensity conflicts 
that America choose (or are forced) to participate in. 
According to airpower analyst Major William Eliason, “[t]he 
spectrum of possible LIC situations has never been fuller. In contrast to the 
growth of these conflicts [LICs], our military capabilities to deal with them will 
likely decrease. This disparity will become most visible when a response to 
multiple LIC crises is requested by our national leadership. Our responses to 
crises in the 1980’s do not provide us with a ready set of military options that 
addresses all forms of low intensity conflict.”62 Although that quote is now ten 
years old, and the decade of unpreparedness to which Eliason refers is 20 years 
past, the context seems as relevant as ever. Frustration with American foreign 
policy, a state of war now lasting more than four years, over extended military 
forces and other constraints all play into the concept that the American “bag of 
tricks” is not as full as it should be. Eliason implies, and this paper suggests that 
if these small conflicts are going to become (or have become) a mainstay of the 
modern political landscape, FID can cover a lot of ground in remedying the 
shortfall of options and forces available to deal with the spectrum of diverse U.S. 
interests. 
FID has the multi-faceted benefit of being a small, mobile force, 
easily tailored to the needs of a specific situation, as well as allowing for an 
avenue to resolve the conflict shy of direct U.S. military participation in combat 
operations. Outside of this construct, POLMIL leaders are left with options that 
tend to be limited: large conventional military forces that are expensive to employ 
and difficult to deploy, or Special Operations forces that are small and 
inexpensive, but whose actions can carry significant political risk. FID can bridge 
the gap and provide the best of both worlds. Although all of that does not come 




62 William T. Eliason. “USAF Support to Low Intensity Conflict: Three Case Studies from the 
1980s.” June 1994. p 64. 
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execute operations in a manner of which the U.S. hopes will be compliant with its 
interests. If managed well, FID can deliver the goods, but history has shown that 
this is not always the case. 
f. Expect Enemies to Have Greater Tech Capabilities 
Even though the trend in conflicts seems to be progressing towards 
actors not necessarily representing specific nation-states, and adversaries less 
advanced than traditional enemies, these new opponents are better organized, 
trained and equipped than ever before. Dean suggests that the weapons 
available to even small revolutionary groups, such as third world military 
organizations in general and especially to former Soviet proxy forces, will make 
conflicts by U.S. forces and/or allies especially difficult.63 Furthermore,  
Even though most 3rd world countries have not developed the 
technology and infrastructure to fully use the weapons they have 
obtained, the mere presence in third world forces of quality aircraft, 
tanks, artillery, and surface to air missiles makes the potential 
destructive capability very great. Highly capable SAMs (Surface to 
Air Missiles) are now available to even the smallest insurgent 
organization and can be used to great effect in 3rd world conflicts.64
Countering the increased capability of well organized and equipped 
insurgents and terrorists is not solely a technical response, but there are certainly 
applications where U.S. innovation in the field of technology is a key component 
of the solution. Providing that capability to allies then becomes as important as 
imparting the wherewithal, so that they may strategically appreciate and tactically 
apply their new skills/equipment in such a manner as to counter the new tactics 
and modern technology of mutual enemies. 
Because the field of aviation deals with such complex weapon 
systems, an especially well crafted organization with a relatively high degree of 
competency is required in order to employ the assets properly. Additionally, with 
the possible exception of air to air combat, air to ground employment/interaction 
represents a penultimate level of aviation expertise. No nation newly participating 
 
63 David J Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”, 1986. p 13. 
64 David J Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”, 1986. p 13. 
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in aviation can expect to be capable on their own, much less competent in any 
short or even medium time period. Because of this, if the U.S. expects American 
allies to compete with at least parity, if not superiority, against increasingly 
sophisticated insurgents and terrorists, there are two possible paths; slow via a 
long time period of host nation exploration on their own, or rapidly via some type 
of equipment/training transfer process. So if the U.S. government and the host 
nation determine the target state needs to have advanced aviation skills, FID is 
the logical manner in which to bridge the aviation gap. In order to impart those 
skills, FID organizations need to have a similarly developed level of adroitness 
both in the application of air power and in the curriculum designed to instruct in 
those skills.  
g. Emphasize Jointness  
Aviation FID is not a unilateral endeavor, rather it serves to support 
other ground and/or naval forces. This is especially true when it comes to anti-
guerrilla, and COIN operations. Air Force doctrine even identifies that in most 
cases A-FID is “conducted jointly with other U.S. service components and 
combined with the activities of foreign military forces in the host nation”.65 Dean 
highlights that even in the U.S., joint interconnectivity tends to be poor, and in 
less developed nations the problems are exacerbated.66 International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) exercises are a prime mechanism for not only 
U.S. to U.S. contacts, but host nation to U.S. and host nation to host nation 
interaction, so as to better understand and exercise in a joint environment. FID is 
an appropriate system to facilitate IMET exercises. Typically, U.S. and host 
nation ground forces will be the major players in the event, and U.S. aviation FID 
serves as the linkage for host nation aviation assets to learn how to effectively 
and safely support ground forces. 
Lastly, U.S. presence can impart seemingly minor and unintended 
benefits to the target nation. Such as, in some nations enlisted soldiers and other 
 
65 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p 1. 
66 David J Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict.” 1986. p 63. 
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junior members of the military are still routinely berated and even physically 
assaulted for any grievance superiors perceive as punishment worthy, even while 
performing in the line of duty.67 This even extends to situations when the junior 
individual’s role is to provide data, but the social structure inhibits the effective 
flow of essential information. Especially in the field of aviation, success can be 
largely determined by the degree and efficiency of communication and 
cooperation between team members. Thus FID is a powerful mechanism for 
showing U.S. counterparts the value of teamwork and respect, but still within a 
military framework. This in turn fosters greater efficiency in host nation joint 
operability, and in combined joint operations. Using the military side of the FID 
framework similar lessons can be imparted to marginalize other problems, via the 
inclusion of humanitarian training, combat ethics and others relevant topics.  
h. Respond Quickly 
The capacity to respond quickly is dependent on several variables. 
First, the political structure needs to exist and operate in such a way as to select 
a course of action and organization to implement that path in an efficient manner. 
The partial intent of this paper falls into the category of educating and 
empowering political and military leadership so that appropriate courses of action 
may be selected then directed with intelligent expediency. Second, the tasked 
organization must have been operating in such a fashion in the past, so as to be 
prepared when the tasking comes, to respond in an appropriate time period. As 
the day-to-day function of any FID organization is to deploy to a target country, 
this is normally not a factor for FID oriented organizations. Third, the physical 
size of the deploying force effects speed of mobility. The footprint of FID 
operations is typically several orders of magnitude smaller than its conventional 
counterpart. The support structure required when a unit brings its own tactical 
equipment (especially in the case of aviation) downrange can easily require 
hundreds of personnel, and even several multiples of that for a large operation. 
But since each FID team member operates on the host nations “turf” (their 
aircraft, their hanger, their perimeter security sites or their hospital) and as each 
 
67 Maj Brian Downs and MSgt Steve Sims USAF. 6 SOS, Personal interview, 26 January and 
10 August 2005. 
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team member is evaluating/teaching/assisting many host nation individuals at 
once, a normal FID deployment can succeed using only a dozen or so 
professionals. Fourth, channels must exist that facilitate the political and military 
implications of US forces arriving in another nation. This is where the daily 
activities of a culturally aware FID organization can facilitate the implementation 
of political decisions to send a force overseas.  
Not only can FID respond quickly, but it can effect change rapidly, 
primarily in its ability to quickly bring an ally “up to speed”. In the late 1970s, well 
prior to modern aviation FID operations, the U.S. sold OV-10s, F-5Es, and Cobra 
attack helicopters to Morocco. The assets were intended to help that state in its 
continuing fight against the insurgent organization Polisario, which had been 
conducting operations against Morocco from the Saharan desert for years. As 
part of the package, the U.S. also sent pilots to teach the Moroccans how to fly, 
employ and utilize their new assets. For a number of reasons, these assets did 
not do much to change the course of the conflict, but in a very short time period 
America was able to lead Morocco from a moderately capable air force, to a 
relatively modern and formidable force.68
i. Maintain and Retain an “Off the Shelf” Capability 
The need to generate an essential military capability from scratch is 
no simple or rapidly achieved task. This is especially true as the nature of the 
equipment and mission increase in complexity. All of the services maintain 
assets and capabilities that they may never or rarely use, but still keep in the 
force structure because the capability lies ready to fill a potential and specific 
strategic or tactical need. The merits of systems such as the F-117 stealth fighter 
can be debated, typically on the issue of cost, but the efficacy of that system to 
meet the discrete need/capability of delivering precision munitions in the highly 
hostile environment of the opening hours of Desert Storm are virtually without 
opposition. In fact, were it not for the “cost” issue (measured across monetary, 
manpower, opportunity, support and other constraints) there would probably be  
 
 
68 David J Dean. “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”, 1986. p 38-51. 
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no opposition to a plethora of military capabilities (whether they be equipment, 
personnel or tactics) that sat poised, each ready to fill only a very specific military 
need, but with great efficacy.  
The converse to this discussion is to ponder the response when a 
nation finds itself short of the assets/equipment necessary to fill a specific need. 
How long would it have taken to have brought a similarly effective asset on-line 
once the decision had been made to commit to Desert Storm, if the F-117 had 
not existed? How well would a modified F-16, or B-1 have been able to execute 
those roles? DoD currently finds itself in one these mission deficiencies: 9/11 
highlighted the importance of military personnel with regional orientation, 
especially in linguistic skills. Having not previously identified the importance of 
that skill set, the services are now in their fourth year of still scrambling to find 
creative ways to increase the number of Airmen, Sailors, Soldiers and Marines 
with cultural and language proficiency. What if in 1990, DoD had decreed that all 
basic training programs include X months of language training? Or the services 
had only recruited personnel who were bilingual to begin with (and the pool of 
potential recruits was large enough to support this plan indefinitely)?  
The benefits of an off the shelf capability are clear, the only reason 
they do not exist universally is either because the need has not been identified or 
system constraints prohibit acquiring the capability. Current A-FID has shown 
that by maintaining skill sets in basic fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets, they can 
easily, rapidly and inexpensively flex to meet a wide range of related skill sets, 
effectively making the 6 SOS a reservoir of military options. But due to the 
additional complexities of offensive operations, AA-FID skills lie just beyond the 
scope of the 6 SOS’s “flex breadth”.  If the need to proffer aviation attack related 
skill sets to allies is seen as a potential use for U.S. forces and the capability can 
be attained and maintained at a reasonable costs, then it makes sense that AA-
FID should exist as an “off the shelf” capability. 
j. Additional Benefits 
In addition to meeting the nine characteristics discussed in the 
previous chapter, FID brings several unique and specialized features to the 
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theater that can significantly empower its effectiveness. The following paragraphs 
outline a panoply of major and minor, unrelated contributions that FID as a tactic 
contribute when utilized as part of a state’s power set. 
Addressing a government’s issues and problems with an 
insurgency and/or terrorism requires multiple means across social, political and 
military spectrums. In dealing with these issues, a nation must possess the 
physical infrastructure/resources that will allow them to implement their breadth 
of chosen strategies. Because of the flexibility of aviation, it can contribute to a 
wide range of possible applications. 
The necessity to maintain the fragile balance in an IDAD strategy 
cannot be overemphasized. Military defeat of an insurgent-type 
organization does not equate to total victory without adequately 
addressing the other facets underlying the hostility—population 
control; social economic, and political reform; improvement of 
government services; civic action; civil defense; or psychological 
operations. The flexibility required in this type of strategy is a strong 
point for the application of air power. In a counterinsurgent role, air 
power can provide leverage through speed and mobility.69
FID is also a bridge-builder for other capabilities. Aviation FID is 
routinely used to enhance and integrate skill sets the host nation already 
possesses. With the proper approval and preparation, a FID organization can 
facilitate the transfer of defense articles via Foreign Military Sales (FMS), or new 
tactical capabilities via Security Assistance (SA).70 If or when a situation 
escalates, and U.S.-host nation agreement is procured, CAAs can operate 
directly with allies in the execution of hostilities. For instance, if the Philippine 
Army decided to use their OV-10 Broncos to conduct a rocket attack against a 
terrorist stronghold prior to an army ground raid, a 6 SOS OV-10 Bronco 
qualified, Tagalog speaking, Pacific region oriented pilot could sit in the rear seat 
and supply not only real time tactical advice and expertise during the mission, but 
serve as a link to the Bronco pilot for any additional intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance (ISR) information that the U.S. might also be providing to assist  
69 John R. Moulton II. Role of the Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense. 
Sep 1991. p. 7. 
70 Institute of Land Warfare.  “Special Operations Forces: An Overview.” BB 80, March 1999. 
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in the mission. This situation might be thought of as somewhat akin to being 
asked to conduct a high speed car chase in your own vehicle, and then being 
offered a seasoned police officer as your passenger. He couldn’t drive the car, 
but his wealth of expertise and experience would only serve to facilitate your 
rookie status and mediocre equipment.  Back to the Philippines, if the situation 
were to escalate further, and the U.S. and the Philippines agreed that U.S. 
aircraft would participate in the anti-terrorist operations, the CAA could then 
serve as an on scene liaison, and significantly increase the efficacy of follow-on 
U.S. forces. 
Especially since the turn of the 21st century, America has 
personified the “evils of globalization”.71 Additionally, a perceived role as “police 
of the world” has done much to vilify views of America, especially in certain 
circles. FID is a mechanism to refute the perception of unilateral U.S. operations, 
and diminish the view of the U.S. as a global hegemonic father figure. Eliason 
argues the point in stating, “the additional benefit of this strategy is the removal of 
the vision of U.S. forces acting as an invading power over both friends and the 
foes of the conflict.”72
Numerous references that tackle the specifics of working with other 
nation’s militaries, note the importance of diplomatic and cultural skills. AFDD 2-
3.1 suggests, “International skills are a force multiplier and essential to the AF's 
ability to operate globally.”73 This marries well with directives from the same 
document that note, “each aviation advisor possesses a record of functional 
expertise in their area as well as language or cross-cultural skills”.74 This is also 
in line with the 6 SOS Mission Essential Task Listing (METL), which lists its 
number four task as,  “gain and maintain language and cultural skills appropriate 
 
71 Ambassador John C. Kornblum. "Globalization and the New Economy: A Personal View.". 
Second Annual FAZ Lecture. October 25, 2000. 
72 William T. Eliason “USAF Support to Low Intensity Conflict: Three Case Studies from the 
1980s.” Jun. 1994. p. 5. 
73 United States Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 17 
Nov 2003. p 3. 
74 United States Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 17 
Nov 2003. p 45. 
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to assigned regional orientation”.75 Team members deeply relate to the adage 
that until you have operated “downrange” you cannot overestimate the value of a 
greeting in the local language, or the detriment of a breach of local custom.76 
Some of this type of knowledge is imparted in programs such as the Cross 
Cultural Communication (CCC) course, and Regional Area Courses taught at 
Hurlburt Field’s Special Operations School (SOS).77 6 SOS members as well as 
many others attend these programs, but they are no substitute for language 
immersion, recurring language training, home-base language labs, day-to-day 
interaction with fellow airmen maintaining the same skill sets, assignment to a 
theater oriented flight with common cultural traits, and recurring visits to the same 
region, and even country, year after year.78 Via this process, FID trained 
individuals almost become mini Foreign Area Officers (FAO), further presenting 
the services with a pool of regional experts. 
One last major benefit is the reemergence of doctrinal thinking on the 
application of airpower to small wars. Current progress in this area is hampered 
by the fact that the U.S. invests so much effort into technical solutions. Because 
of this strong “technology” vision, prominent thinkers have stopped thinking about 
more primitive ways to address problems.79 The ineffectiveness of attack aviation 
assets in the urban setting could be a problem set with possible solutions if 
airpower theorists viewed the issue out of the “what can the B-2 and F-22 deliver” 
construct. Re-introducing the types of assets discussed in this paper may open 
the door for the revisiting of doctrine with regards to what a light attack asset 
might be able to contribute to the GWOT. In turn, an organization like the 6 SOS 
 
75 6 SOS Mission Essential Task Listing. p 1. 
76 Brian Downs, Major USAF. 6 SOS, Personal interview, 26 January 2005. 
77 See, https://www.hurlburt.af.mil/milonly/tenantunits/jsou/ for additional information on the 
Air Force Special Operations School. 
78 6 SOS personnel are assigned to a flight, which is oriented regionally (Pacific, Latin 
America, Middle East, and Europe/Africa as of the publication of this thesis). Members may 
deploy with flights outside their regional specialty, but each individual is primarily assigned and 
responsible for a tactically relevant language, cultural and diplomatic skills, and most importantly, 
operations, within their area of responsibility (AOR).   
79 Richard D. Newton. Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal 
Defense. August 1991, p. 2.  
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could serve as a focal point for subject matter experts and the genesis of 
strategic and tactical thought along those lines.  A good example of this is 
Jerome Klingaman’s Joint Strike Team Cadre.80
2. AA-FID  
To this point, the focus has been primarily on how FID and even aviation 
FID meets the list of objectives. As the scope of discussion narrows, it becomes 
more challenging to identify how a specific strategy/tactic (AA-FID) meets the 
globally defined qualifiers discussed above. This section is devoted to identifying 
specifically how (and what) aviation attack options contribute to this discussion. 
Consider Kyrgyzstan, a nation of vital U.S. interest who “has been a 
dependable and outspoken ally in the Global War on Terrorism”, and “provides 
crucial support for Coalition forces, for Operation Enduring Freedom, [and] 
Operation Iraqi Freedom”.81 In July-August of 1999, nearly 800 Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (UMI) guerrillas invaded Kyrgyzstan taking hostages, 
with the goal of fomenting an Islamic state there that might be used to later 
expand into Uzbekistan. Due to a lack of indigenous capabilities, the Kyrgyzstani 
government had to request urgent air support from neighboring allies (both 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in this case) in order to prosecute the insurgents. A 
similar event occurred again 2000, where U.S. tourists were part of those taken 
hostage. Again, foreign air support was required to execute the campaign to free 
the hostages and expel the terrorists.82
With the level of dedication the Kyrgyzstan government has shown 
towards the GWOT, their actions provide a simple scenario to ponder the value 
of a series of A-FID packages designed to alleviate the need for this ally to  
 
 
80 Although Mr. Klingaman’s (6 SOS Executive Officer) paper has not yet been published, he 
has advocated building specialized teams that are “specifically organized, trained and equipped 
to attack and neutralize (find, fix, and destroy) small, mobile guerrilla/terrorist targets, including 
their defended positions.”  
81 Congressional Research Staff. “Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests.” 
CRS Report for Congress. 26 May 2005. p. 1. 
82 Congressional Research Staff. “Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests.” 
CRS Report for Congress. 26 May 2005. pp. 5-7. 
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procure vital air support from an external government. This example is intended 
to show that it is fairly simple to identify allies that could serve to benefit from 
such an exchange. 
a. Missions 
From the macro viewpoint, FID contributes to “counter insurgency 
support [by allowing] the US government to assist a local foreign government by 
identifying the problems within its country, and taking the required political, 
economic and social actions to redress them”.83 However, the term “aviation 
attack” generates a fairly specific mental image of capabilities, such as dropping 
bombs or strafing tanks, that can seem incongruous with the definition above. 
Those graphically offensive roles are a part of what is being discussed here, but 
their more important relevance is their similarity to a whole range of missions 
which can be directly used to support the host nation’s ability to maintain order. 
Interacting rapidly and accurately with the ground from the air (be it a “talk-on” 
from a soldier on the ground, or finding a target based on old satellite photos), 
surviving in a lethal environment, operating a sophisticated machine (and its sub-
systems) either by yourself or with a very small crew, is a generic, but difficult to 
master skill set.84 Once a nation has the assets and aircrews that posses these 
skills, the range of mission that can be utilized can be invaluable to any nation; 
Close Air Support, Forward Air Controller, Killer Scout, Interdiction, 
Reconnaissance, On Scene Commander, Search and Rescue, Air Borne 
Command Control Communications, Sandy, Escort, and Suppression of Enemy 
Air Defenses to name a few.  
Specifically, one of the important functions of newly emergent Air 
Forces is the enhancement of roles previously only conducted in two dimensions. 
Referring to COIN operations, Moulton noted, “neutralization of the threat in this 
 
83 William T. Eliason. “USAF Support to Low Intensity Conflict: Three Case Studies from the 
1980s.” June 1994. p 5. 
84 “Talk-on” is a term to describe the act of an individual attempting to talk a pilot’s eyes on to 
a specific target, so that the pilot may perform his mission as it applies to that target. For the 
discussion here, that role is usually accomplished by a Forward Air Controller (FAC) who can 
either be on the ground or in the air, and has a high degree of familiarity with the target 
environment. 
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type of warfare requires tactics that counter the guerrilla’s advantage of mobility, 
surprise and deception. For the ground forces commander this is accomplished 
by using small-unit patrols, ambushes, night operations, and flexibility.”85 Aviation 
is ideally suited to supplement all of these missions from above, and can even go 
the next step, when appropriate, with the delivery of ordinance. 
The application of CAS in combat has gone through a recent 
revolution in the U.S., both in number and quality.86 Conventional wisdom holds 
that CAS is still not utilized or developed to its greatest capacity. A number of 
airpower theorists suggest that the growing momentum in the CAS community 
could yield significant gains with regards to CT and COIN operations. One report 
from the Congressional Research Staff stated, 
Many of the functions inherent in CAS, such as tracking enemy 
forces, differentiating friendly forces from foes, quickly delivering 
weapons against moving targets, and closely controlling and 
coordinating air and ground forces to reduce the chance of 
fratricide or collateral damage, are applicable air-actions against 
non-state actors. Therefore, assessing how the CAS mission is 
evolving, what key challenges are inherent in the mission, and how 
those challenges are being addressed should provide a useful 
framework for assessing how military aviation may be applied to 
non-state actors.87
The instrumental point is that attack aviation skill sets do not 
exclusively consist of the much hyped “bombs and bullets” missions. Rather, by 
building a nation’s air force to the point were crews can drop high Circular Error 
Probable (CEP) bombs in a hostile environment, implies they also have, or can 
easily progress to, a broader range of combat related tasks that can be highly 
supportive of “small war” tactics.88
 
85 John R. Moulton II. Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense. Sep. 
1991, p. 7. 
86 Christopher Bolkom, and Katzman Kenneth. “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for 
Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. CRS Report for Congress. 24 January 2005. p 6. 
87 Christopher Bolkom, and Katzman Kenneth. “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for 
Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. CRS Report for Congress. 24 January 2005. p 5. 
88 “An indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining 
probably damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half a missiles projectile’s are 
expected to fall. Also called CEP.” United States Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02. 12 Apr 2001, amended 9 May 2005. 
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b. Application 
Primarily though, a nation seeks these skill sets so they may 
employ assets in “counterland roles.” AFDD 2-1.3 defines counterland as, 
“operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of superiority over 
surface operations by the destruction, disrupting, delaying, diverting, or other 
neutralization of enemy forces. The main objectives of counterland operations 
are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing 
the same”.89 In the execution of these missions, attrition of ground troops is 
frequently not the primary purpose. Aircraft serve as a mechanism to enhance 
and support ground operations, even when the activity that the aircraft is 
performing is inherently offensive. Dropping bombs on a site before a ground 
attack is intended to shock and surprise the enemy, so as to magnify the 
effectiveness of the assaulting force. When a ground troop calls for fire on an 
enemy bunker, the intent is to prohibit the enemy from performing offensive 
actions, so that friendly forces may proceed with theirs. Admittedly, attrition of the 
enemy is a possible and plausible outcome of these types of actions, but not their 
purpose.  
Close air support and interdiction are undeniably important in 
security and neutralization. Because of the nature of third-world 
conflicts, discretion in the use of air-to-ground armament is 
paramount. The primary purpose of CAS is to support ground 
forces in accomplishing their mission, not to replace them. Overuse 
and indiscriminate application of force can have devastating 
results....One prudent application of CAS would be in support of law 
officials in counter-narcotics operations. Forces would employ 
tactics and munitions to enhance suppression, shock and 
intimidation. Recourse to lethal force would only be used to support 
troops in contact. Interdiction also plays an important role by 
denying the enemy sanctuaries and limiting external logistical 
support. Defeating the insurgents’ abilities to organize and resupply 
is one method to beat them at their own games. However, as with 
close air support, interdiction in the LIC environment leaves no 
room for indiscriminate actions. Collateral damage at the low end of 
 
89 United States Air Force. Air Force Basic Doctrine: Air Force Doctrine Document 1. 17 
November 2003. p. 80. 
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the conflict spectrum carries a lot more political and psychological 
baggage than misstates at upper levels.90
This is a concept of crucial importance with regard to AA-FID. Low 
aviation-technology nations tend to perceive firepower as an end-all be-all 
solution to tactical problems, and aspire to apply their new found trade in not only 
tactically unwise fashions, but also in a manner that potentially reflects poorly on 
the host nation and on America. Abuses by the police in Indonesia during the 
early 1990s are indicative of this syndrome. Indonesian police forces had been 
taught skills and sold equipment by the U.S. meant to be used in a riot control 
scenario. While at a public demonstration, Indonesian police responded 
inappropriately and violently using the new tactics (and equipment) they had 
acquired from the U.S. and slaughtered 270 peaceful demonstrators. The 
international backlash and subsequent regression in relations between the U.S. 
and Indonesia are still affecting both countries today.91
Because of the potential lethality of airpower, and the potential 
some nations have to misuse it, it is essential that allies the U.S. brings on board 
truly understand capabilities introduced to them. As in the Indonesian example, 
this issue is magnified by the limits on the ability to control the host nation’s use 
of new skills once the U.S. departs the target country. This is the true challenge 
of FID, and the reason that units specifically trained in not only the technical but 
the diplomatic aspects of this mission are paramount to its success. 
In light of these drawbacks, and the fact that there is an end state 
the U.S. wishes to achieve, the lesson that needs to be taught is “air power can 
support security and neutralization efforts very effectively through counterland 
operations” but only when employed with wisdom.92 Interdiction represents one 
end of the spectrum, and “involves actions taken to divert, disrupt, delay, or 
 
90 John R. Moulton II. Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign Internal Defense. 
September 1991, pp. 8-9. 
91Frida Berrigan. “Indonesia at the Crossroads: U.S. Weapons Sales and Military Training” 
World Policy Institute: Arms Trade Resource Center, October 2001. 
92 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p. 18. 
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destroy the enemy’s surface military forces and capabilities before they can be 
used effectively against friendly forces.”93 These types of effects on the enemy 
lie almost exclusively in the realm of aviation to achieve. Conversely, the types of 
enemies faced in anti insurgent, guerrilla or terrorist operation tend not to be as 
vulnerable to this type of attack. But in the types of operations occurring in 
nations like the Philippines, Yemen and Pakistan (just to name a few), “air 
delivered munitions for CAS in site defense, convoy escort, offensive tactical 
maneuvers, and other troops in contact situations” can be of immense value.94 
For the reasons discussed above, attacks of this kind “should be limited to tactics 
and munitions designed for suppression, shock and intimidation rather than 
maximum lethality.”95 Munitions and delivery mechanisms of a low tech nature 
with minimally required effects (usually explosive material) are superior at 
achieving this end. Thus bullets, rockets, Hellfires, Mavericks, or SDBs (small 
diameter bombs) would typically be preferred over Mk-82s, Mk-84s, “bunker-
busters” or other such large munitions. 
Lastly, the flexibility of AA-FID skills lend themselves to supporting 
other state, non-military agencies. But the same “military rules” discussed above 
still apply; such as when the partner is law enforcement, federal agencies, or 
involves actions against socially condemned activities (such as the war on 
drugs). “In countering other forms of lawlessness (drug, civil disorders, etc) 
surface operations are often aimed at controlling territory, arresting people, and 
seizing contraband rather than inflicting casualties”.96  
Given the general effectiveness of airpower, and the specific 
benefits of attack aviation assets, the challenge lays both in determining how 
airpower can specifically contribute to a particular conflict, then ensuring the host 
 
93 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p. 18. 
94 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p. 18. 
95 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p. 18. 
96 United States Air Force. Foreign Internal Defense: Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3.1. 10 
May 2004. p. 18. 
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nation understands the limits of that application. Thus if FID organizations are to 
expand into AA-FID roles, they must continue to monitor the contexts in which 
they deliver these skills, and would do well to develop a “think-tank” mentality so 
as to possibly improve upon the rarely visited role of urban airpower. 
c. Jointness Revisited 
The issue of jointness has already been highlighted to some 
degree, but the relationship between aircraft and ground troops is constrained by 
two major factors; first, that the result of poor air-to-ground interface can be 
fratricide and second, that it is not reasonable to practice this interface outside of 
using real aircraft in the air and real people on the ground. Because of these two 
major limitations, any nation that plans on employing air-to-ground assets 
(including “benign” fighter type roles, such as FAC, Scout, Reconnaissance, etc) 
on their own soil must have professionally sustained training in that skill set. Due 
to the complexity and steep learning curve of aviation, AA-FID is the only viable 
mechanism to get a comparatively aviation-primitive nation to that point in a 
reasonable time period. 
This would suggest that air-to-ground fastmover skills are not for 
everyone; which is a correct conclusion in this author’s viewpoint. Thorough 
research on the host nation needs to be conducted before commencing on the 
path of offering AA-FID. From there, a proper “crawl, walk, run” paradigm can be 
applied. For some nations, the “crawl” phase may begin with instruction on how 
to receive a talk-on from another airborne asset (an advanced aviation skill). 
While for others, “crawl” may involve entirely non offensive related skills, such as 
simple point to point transport operations (a basic aviation skill). This type of 
training may be conducted with the notion that at some point in the future, the 
host nation’s general aviation competence level may rise to the point where more 
sophisticated skill sets and platforms may be introduced, eventually including 
aviation attack, (if warranted). 
U.S. assistance to Morocco in 1979 provides an excellent example 
of this type of situation. Moroccan pilots were skilled and capable in fighter 
related skills. When they faced a new threat from Polisario insurgent forces in the 
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form of the highly effective Soviet made SA-6 Gainful surface to air missile 
system, they requested help from the United States. Although the level of 
Moroccan aviation expertise was shy of what was required before they could be 
taught Wild Weasel tactics 97, their proficiency has high enough that the right 
training and equipment did allow the Moroccan’s to counter the threat.98 This 
example shows the importance of recognizing the host nation’s current level of 
aviation expertise, correctly identifying an appropriate and attainable end-state, 
then implementing a rational series of training steps to bridge that gap. 
d. Colin Gray 
As a last approach to considering what utility AA-FID might offer, 
consider Colin Gray’s “generic” checklist for measuring the utility of special 
operations functions. In 1999 Gray published his eleven rules for SOF success, 
under Handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures: When do special operations 
succeed? Gray’s historically based heuristic tool is simplistic yet powerful. Can 
Gray’s rules contribute to the clarification of the political and operational fog that 
surrounds the introduction of aviation attack roles to the nation’s military 
inventory of foreign taught skills? 
At first, Gray’s rules seem intuitively obvious (flexible, feasible, 
competent, etc), as in any lay person could have generated the same list with 
only a modicum of thought. To an extent that is true. What adds power to Gray’s 
model is the explanation behind his categories. The descriptive terms that make 
up the list are just the bait, the bigger prize lie in the details of measuring how a 
force meets (or fails to meet) the concept. Even then, Gray warns that the points 





97 Wild Weasel refers to the role of Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), which 
includes, “That activity that neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy 
air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. Also called SEAD.” United States 
Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02. 12 
Apr 2001, amended 9 May 2005. 
98 David J. Dean “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986.  p 67. 
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criteria are met. The list is a tool to determine the expectation of political and 
operational yield from a SOF endeavor, or in Gray’s words, “the opportunity to 
extract strategic utility.”99
Typically, models that attempt to frame questions of the suitability 
of an action focus on either the tactical or strategic issues. Gray’s model rather, 
spans the spectrum from political wherewithal (strategy) down to actual 
competency of the team members in question (tactics). In some respects, this 
waters down his approach, but as the question is really aimed at determining 
broadly defined answers to questions of “will this work”, there remains a certain 
amount of free-form flexibility in this approach. This particularly lends itself to 
analyzing the aviation FID issue for two reasons. First, the FID application of 
SOF is quite divergent from missions traditionally associated with special 
operations. As such, other models aimed specifically at conventional or 
unconventional operations can fail to capture the middle ground nature of the FID 
endeavor. Second, the act of conducting AA-FID missions still remains at heart, 
primarily a question of politics, but at the same time the actual conduct of these 
operations occur in a very unique tactical environment. Colin Gray’s framework 
provides a flexibility that can be used to examine the issues across this spectrum 
of concerns. 
His list is short, as are the descriptions provided below. The intent 
is not to instill fluency in the topic, but rather familiarity so as the context may be 
used for discussion with regards to aviation FID.100
1. Policy Demand: Suitability of the age 
a. SOF need to meet the distinctive policy demands of each 
era. 
b. SOF need to change with the diminishing ability of 
conventional military options. 
2. Politics 
 
99 Gray, Colin S. “Handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures: When do special operations 
succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999.  
100 Gray, Colin S. “Handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures: When do special operations 
succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999. 
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a. SOF need permissive domestic conditions, a tolerant 
political and strategic structure 
b. SOF need an educated consumer, political and military 
patrons who appreciate what SOF should, and should 
not, be asked to do. 
c. SOF need a political legitimate mission. 
d. SOF need an attractive political message for the 
recruitment of local allies. 
e. SOF can benefit from a positive political message for the 
enemy. 
f. SOF need support from regular military forces generally 
judged likely to win. 
3. Feasible objectives 
a. SOF need objectives that they can secure without the aid 
of regular units. 
b. SOF need protection from the fantasies of political 
sponsors. 
c. Decision makers must consult special operations experts 
before deciding on missions. 
4. Strategy 
a. SOF need a high command that possesses a strategic 
mentality. 
b. SOF benefit from a supportive strategic context, 
particularly one in which regular forces need assistance. 
c. SOF need a political-military framework into which they 
can fit. 
d. SOF need a stable overall war strategy to which they can 
contribute. 
5. Flexibility of mind 
a. SOF need the ability to support regular military 
operations, as well as to perform independently. 
b. SOF should not be doctrinaire. 
c. SOF need to exploit surprise. 
6. Absence of alternatives 
a. SOF prosper when conventional operations are 
prohibited by political factors, ruled out as too expensive, 
or otherwise are deemed inappropriate. 
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b. Special operations prosper in conflicts suited to the skills 
of SOF. 
c. SOF prosper in a strategic context of diminished 
conventional options. 
7. Enemy vulnerabilities 
a. SOF need an enemy with exploitable vulnerabilities. 
b. SOF benefit from a stupid enemy unable or unwilling to 
learn from its mistakes, or unable to reduce its 
vulnerabilities. 
c. SOF fare well when they can turn an enemy's strength 
into a weakness. 
d. SOF can benefit from an oppressive enemy. 
e. SOF need a substantial and accessible enemy rear area 
in which to operate. 
8. Technological assistance 
a. SOF need every advantage that technology can provide. 
9. Tactical competence 
a. Only SOF skilled in their trade should conduct special 
operations. 
b. SOF need intensive and comprehensive study of their 
targets. 
c. SOF need exceptional human and material assets. 
d. SOF require coordination with conventional operations, 
or with the activities of the police 
10. Reputation 
a. It is most desirable that SOF should be feared. 
11. History 
a. Special operations need to be launched at the right time. 
b. Special operations need to be studied as integral to the 
strategic history of conflict and war. 
c. SOF need to engage the strategic imagination of 
historians. 
  
The next step then is to map Gray’s categories onto aviation FID, to 
see what his analytical tool indicates about the possibilities of AA-FID roles. 
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Policy Demand: “America will help nations that need our 
assistance in combating terror”, as introduced previously from the National 
Security Strategy, are indicative of the many contexts in which America now 
professes that empowering its allies to aid in the Global War on Terrorism is a 
new tenet in American policy.101 FID clearly fits into the picture as a prime 
mechanism for executing this arm of U.S. doctrine, but how do aviation attack 
assets fit into the picture? For the execution of autonomous operations, they play 
pivotal roles in tactically correct circumstances; Afghanistan providing numerous 
examples of what CAS, Forward Air Control (FAC), target softening, and the like 
can provide.   
We’ve also shown a policy of using attack roles autonomously. In 
November of 2002, a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) conducted an attack on 
suspected terrorists in the Yemen desert.102 This incident produced considerable 
media and political attention, but what if the U.S. had provided that capability to 
the American ally in the war on terror, and Yemen had conducted the attack on 
their own? 
Another example of this is the Philippine capture of Commander 
Robot discussed earlier. What if the helicopter crews had also been trained with 
fixed forward firing ordinance, such as rockets, and the site had been softened 
prior to the attack? Or a Philippine OV-10 Bronco had been on scene, also with 
NVGs, providing CAS? Would Commander Robot have initially escaped? Could 
Philippine casualties have been significantly reduced? Could the use of 
Philippine ground troops have been reduced to a team only required to sweep 
the site, post attack? None of these may have been the correct tactic for this 
situation, but none were an option, as one of America’s closest allies in the war 
on terror does not posses any of these capabilities. 
 
101 United States  White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
September 2002. 
102 Craig Hoyle and Andrew Koch. “Yemen Drone Strike: Just the start?” Jane’s. 8 
November 2002. 
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It seems clear that empowering allies is a policy objective; it also 
seems clear that the integrated use of airpower is policy goal as well.  Even given 
just a few examples, it seems America has already made policy the skills to 
which FID is designed to provide. Thus it “makes sense” that aviation attack roles 
provided through the FID mechanism constitute an overt and active element of 
policy in fighting the Global War on Terror. 
Politics: To discuss this properly, the politics of both the U.S. and 
of the host nation need to be addressed. Usually by the time America has agreed 
to work with any particular state, they have the political wherewithal to support 
the bilateral operation being proposed, thus local obstacles are minimized. 
Similarly, US interaction with foreign air forces is typically an “empowering” 
scenario, both for the forces being taught, and as a message to the opponents, 
that the government is acquiring an upgrade in their operational and offensive 
capabilities. As the footprint of a FID operation tends to be very small (less than 
12 individuals), this mechanism can aid in the minimization of the impact of 
foreign forces on the host nation’s soil. Further aiding the effort, typically this type 
of instruction is conducted as a joint endeavor, with both American and host 
nation forces (be they Army, Navy or Marine) contributing to the lessons learned 
in the joint-combined operation. So once the U.S. has been “invited to play”, host 
nation politics usually present no major obstacles. Rather it is the U.S. political 
system that tends to places constraints on the conduct of these operations.  
In the post 9/11 environment, America has had relatively 
“permissive domestic conditions, a tolerant political and strategic structure” as 
well as a “political legitimate mission”.103 In fact, one of the great allures of FID is 
the entire new range of options that it affords leadership. In the former Yemen 
example, if the political costs had been too high to have conducted the UAV 
attack, FID may have been an open source (after the attack) method to have 
achieved the same results with fewer political repercussions and similar tactical 
effectiveness. Where politics causes problems is in ensuring that FID has “an 
 
103 Gray, Colin S. “Handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures: When do special operations 
succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999. 
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educated consumer, political and military patrons who appreciate what SOF 
should, and should not, be asked to do”.104
From the U.S. side, as FID is a relatively “new” and not widely used 
tool, Combatant Commanders are generally uneducated and/or unfamiliar with 
the capabilities and limitations of FID forces, and the probability exists, that 
without an education/control mechanism, FID (especially the introduction of 
offensive capabilities) could be used in such a way as to cause unacceptable 
political consequences.105 Therein lies why the political system has issue with 
FID. One need only look at friends turned enemies (stinger equipped 
Mujahedeen turned Taliban from the Russian-Afghan war), twisted purposes 
(Indonesian 1991 use of U.S. military equipment and tactics on peaceful 
demonstrators in East Timor), or future potential problems (if Pakistan forces 
were given CAS capability to patrol the Afghan border, how could the U.S. 
ensure the forces were not used in Kashmir?)106 Conversely though, Army 
Special Forces (SF) has been conducting offensive related FID training for 
decades, with a relatively high degree of success in avoiding the types of pitfalls 
discussed here.107 The loss of U.S. control of assets and skills is a daunting 
issue for the political process, and one that will remain at the front of the 
concerns against the introduction of any offensive related FID training. 
Feasible Objectives: Objectives are largely driven by the 
Combatant Commander, who were previously identified as potential “shortfalls” in 
FID action channels; but realistically those are very surmountable problems. 
Formal education of key leaders, or incorporating FID experts on their staff could 
do much to assuage problems related to FID efforts being applied to 
 
104 Gray, Colin S. “Handfuls of heroes on desperate ventures: When do special operations 
succeed?” Parameters, Spring 1999. 
105 Mr. Jerome Klingaman. Personal interview, 27January 2005. 
106 B. Raman. “USA's Afghan Ops: A Critical Analysis”. South Asia Analysis Group, 22 
October 2001. And, “Indonesia”. Federation Of American Scientists, March 2002. 
107 John Rudy and Ivan Eland. “Special Operations Military Training Abroad and its 
Dangers”. CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing. June 22, 1999. This is not to imply that there 
have been no breaches, or that there is no potential for inappropriate actions. Rather that given 
the immense scope of operations that have occurred over the years, there are relatively few 
substantiated cases of misconduct. 
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inappropriate tasks. On a more tactical level, just because an agreement is 
entered to offer a particular nation a new aviation skill doesn’t mean that the 
objective is feasible. Many third world nations barely maintain an air force, much 
less combat capable assets that can fly often enough to maintain proficiency for 
their aircrews in the new skill set. Without a much larger plan that 1) assesses 
the host nation’s ability to achieve and maintain a basal level of operations and 2) 
provides monies to supplement operations if required, then any skills imparted on 
the host nation may fall useless within a short time period. In this equation, the 
condition of the airframes, airfields, aircrew, support infrastructure, logistics, and 
a multitude of other factors, must be considered. The shortfall of any one of these 
host nation characteristics is capable of rendering the objective unfeasible. 
Strategy: Prior to the GWOT, Army FID programs had shown the 
generic utility of FID, and how FID can contribute key capabilities to a successful 
strategic game plan. Aviation FID in particular has further refined that role, 
especially in the post 9/11 environment. The NSS, National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for Homeland Defense, and other 
national doctrinal documents all support and point the way for FID as a major tool 
of national policy. The key to effective strategic incorporation/employment falls 
into two categories already discussed: POLMIL commitment to the concept 
(money, manpower, and opportunities), and leadership capable of utilizing AA-
FID intelligently. 
Flexibility of Mind: One of Gray’s tenets in this category is the 
support of regular military operations. FID is unusual in that it never functions to 
meet its own needs. From a U.S. perspective, by definition a FID operation does 
not function autonomously, but operates to support host nation forces conducting 
both conventional and unconventional campaigns. Although the immediate 
benefactor is the target countries regular forces, occastionally A-FID operations 
revolve around another U.S. agency (Army, Navy, SOF, Marines) conducting 
training (or FID) with the host nation, and A-FID serves to support and magnify 
the gains of the bilateral event.  
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Absence of Alternatives: This feature is the forte of FID, and 
especially of A-FID. The internationally perceived unilateral nature of the war in 
Iraq has largely limited the already narrow scope of operations that conventional 
(or unconventional) US forces can conduct on foreign shores. FID’s small 
footprint, lack of overtly offensive nature, and relatively inexpensive cost create a 
“permissiveness” that allows for an expanded spectrum of opportunities not 
otherwise afforded political leadership. As the U.S. executes the war on terror as 
outlined in the NSS and other documents, America will find that allies’ fielded 
forces are a key component in that war. The relatively ubiquitous nature of 
“armies” means most every nation has some capability to commit troops/police 
against terrorists where appropriate. In some cases, a lack of indigenous skills 
means that U.S. FID efforts can contribute to the host nation’s effectiveness in 
these efforts. The inherent higher associated costs of aviation, and “perishability” 
of skill sets means fewer nations posses the flying components to complement 
ground strategy.  
Although transport and support related airpower is typically a 
requisite element of counterinsurgent or anti-terror operations, offensive related 
components are frequently not considered for these types of missions. But as 
discussed, examples in the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, plus 
Columbia, Venezuela, and other locations indicate that aviation attack profiles 
can play a significant role. Thus, where strategically appropriate and tactically 
reasonable, having a CAS or FAC capability in the national arsenal expands the 
potential operational toolset.  
Enemy Vulnerabilities: “Enemy vulnerabilities” as a Gray concept 
does not apply to owned forces, but is primarily considered in regard to host 
nation forces. Aviation attack assets bring a wealth of capabilities and concerns 
to the battle space previously not conducted in the third dimension. Interdiction, 
CAS and FAC type roles:  
• Expand the physical battle space (in range) into which 
government forces can operate. 
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• Expand the physical battle space (into remote and difficult to 
access locations) into which government forces can operate. 
• Present a technological threat that is difficult to defend 
against. 108 
• Serve as a force multiplier for primary mission combat and 
support elements (i.e. ground forces conducting a raid). 
• Present a message of government force superiority. 
US operations in Afghanistan, as well as the Philippine and Yemen 
examples above highlight how ground forces of a relatively low-tech enemy can 
be particularly susceptible to the strategic and tactically smart application of 
airborne firepower. 
Airpower in this aspect is particularly powerful in environments 
where the enemy considers his remote/rural location as an asymmetrical 
advantage for hiding from the government. Coupled with good intelligence, 
offensive airpower can autonomously or in concert with ground forces do much to 
ensure success in an operation. Conversely, the employment of accurate air-to-
ground munitions by any other than a technologically sophisticated nation can be 
very difficult. Thus the purely offensive roles of aviation are probably of less value 
in densely populated areas and urban roles. But the same platforms can then still 
be used effectively in other support roles (FAC, ABCCC, Rescue, or Scout roles.) 
Technological Assistance: This is a challenging subject for those 
involved in formulating and implementing FID objectives. Typically the platform 
itself is the technological advantage, although occasionally additional leverage 
can be gained with the introduction of new equipment and associated capabilities 
(i.e. NVGs, GPS - Global Positioning System, FLIR - Forward Looking Infra Red, 
extraction equipment, etc). A delicate balance must be found between the 
amount of technology introduced and the host nation’s ability to maintain both the 
equipment and skills upon departure of the CAA training team. For example, an 
 
108 Although an effective air defense, much less an IADS (Integrated Air Defense System) is 
a virtually unachievable state for any but a well funded and technologically advanced nation, 
primitive air defense can be achieved relatively cheap and easily. Black market MANPADS (Man 
Portable Air Defense System), such as the U.S. Stinger or Russian SA-18 Grouse are highly 
effective, easy to operate, and cheap to acquire. Additionally, the impact of a successful 
MANPAD employment can be significantly detrimental to government forces especially compared 
to the effort used to take the aircraft down. 
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F-16 might be the ideal platform for the Philippine air force to conduct urban 
attack operations, but it is entirely unrealistic for the Philippine AF to be able to 
afford the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs associated with utilizing the 
F-16, much less provide enough flying hours for aircrew to maintain competency 
in the advanced skill sets. Conversely, the Russian built SU-25 Frogfoot might 
also be an acceptable platform, with a significantly reduced O&M footprint. But 
access to spare parts or communications suite compatibility could make that 
platform similarly unacceptable. Notionally, the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco (an 
airframe already owned by the Philippine Army), when coupled with a portable 
GPS, NVGs and training in joint call-for-fire procedures might provide just the 
right mix of technological capability and maintenance costs.  
This issue must be tackled individually for each nation and for each 
mission type being supported to ensure the proper type of assistance is being 
introduced.  
Tactical Competence: The 6th Special Operations Squadron, 
America’s only Aviation FID squadron has already “solved the problem” of 
tactical competence. All squadron members are volunteers, required to be 
instructors in their field of expertise, subjected to wide depth and breadth of 
training upon arrival at the 6th, and maintain a highly specialized and selective 
skill set by utilizing host nation representative airframes.109 This is not to say that 
the squadron can guarantee that every squadron member is at the peak of their 
professional expertise, but rather that a selective and robust system has been 
emplaced to maximize the odds that most CAAs are operating at the level of 
professionalism required for these challenging roles. 
But switching to the actual assets that the advisors train with, this is 
one area in which U.S. capability falls short of that which attack aviation could 
provide. Historically the 6 SOS has only trained in helicopter and transport 
 
109 Mr. Jerome Klingaman, Personal interview, 27January 2005. In the ten years of the 6 
SOS’s existence, the squadron has had a diverse array of aircraft on their ramp, including the 
Casa-212, Bell UH-1N, Mil Mi-8 Hip, McDonald Douglas C-47, AN-26 Curl and other aircraft. 
Additionally, the squadron secures access through various other means to dozens of other 
platforms when a specific mission calls for expertise on that airframe.  
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related skills sets, and thus maintained transport and helicopter airframes. In 
order to provide attack related skill sets and ensure CAA tactical expertise, the 6 
SOS would have to provide access to suitable platforms to maintain the requisite 
skill sets. Ideally the Mi-24 Hind and the C-47 Skytrain could be reasonable, 
affordable and representative assets to maintain helicopter and gunship aviation 
attack skills. But especially with regards to fixed-wing attack roles, it becomes 
more difficult to find the right mix. The OV-10 Bronco seems a good candidate, 
but would poorly suit skill sets aimed at faster moving platforms, such as the F-5 
Tiger II or dedicated CAS platforms like the SU-25 Frogfoot. The T-38 Talon is a 
variant of the Tiger II, and the OA-10 Warthog is very similar to the Frogfoot, so 
either of these two could be used to train in for nations using the F-5 or Frogfoot. 
Whichever platform is chosen, it neglects the flight and tactical characteristics of 
the diversity of aviation attack platforms flown by other third world nations. 
Unless the 6th is willing to maintain multiple fixed wing attack platforms for 
training purposes, it will be difficult to keep its CAAs proficient in these skills. This 
“sticky issue” of tactical competence for “fighter” aviation advisors will continue to 
present problems for the FID community. 
Reputation: The 6 SOS conducts all of their operations overtly. 
This is not to say that operations security procedures are not adhered to in order 
to ensure the safety of their deployments, but rather that FID missions are not 
“black ops” or secret training ventures. In order to ensure access to present and 
future training opportunities, the squadron stays out of the business of activities 
that would imply a compromise of the target nation’s interests. Likewise, they 
protect the interests of nations they train with by not overtly revealing the nature 
and extent of the training that occurs. Thus the target nations have little access to 
reputation based information on the 6 SOS. Occasionally countries like the 
Philippines choose not to keep training information closely held, and the world is 
privy to the contributions FID can make to a nation’s aviation capabilities. 
Additionally, the 6 SOS frequently conducts repeat visits to target nations and 
establishes a reputation and friendship with local and state forces. 
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Within the U.S. military, 6 SOS’s reputation is built on two different 
factors. First is the high caliber of individuals who are selected to join the 
squadron; this in itself establishes a (mixed bag) reputation, as the squadron is 
seen somewhat as an organization of highly capable elites. The best indicator of 
the squadron’s reputation is the word of mouth praise that various other US 
agencies (SF, SEAL, CA, Department of State, etc) offer after conducting joint 
operations with the 6 SOS. Thus, the 6 SOS does not carry a reputation of fear 
(as implied by Gray as important to SOF), but rather one of professional 
competence, both by perceived by foreign nations and by indigenous US 
forces.110  
History: An aviation squadron exists today because of 
retrospective thinking on the topic. Despite the mystique of failure surrounding 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, some viable and valuable military applications 
found root there. In the early ‘90’s academics began to recognize and 
concentrate on the global political and military situation in the post cold war, and 
generally concluded that the activities of the superpowers had left a battlespace 
conducive to various types of small wars throughout the third world.111 Thus ,FID 
was resurrected as a historically and contextually appropriate response to the 
“new threat”. 
Since aviation attack roles are currently not part of America’s FID 
repertoire, the possibilities for historically based or forward looking roles for these 
assets in the hands of American allies on the war on terror, present numerous 
tantalizing possibilities. As an exercise in thought, imagine: 
• Iraqi forces conducting autonomous coordinated CAS 
supported attacks on insurgent strongholds. 
• An Indonesian FAC(A) talking Indonesian ground forces onto 
a terrorist hold-up site. 
• An Omani pilot dropping accurate conventional munitions on 
a desert terrorist training camp with follow-on ground forces 
just outside lethal range, and ready to attack. 
 
110 Mr. Jerome Klingaman. Personal interview, 27January 2005. 
111 David Hogan. Centuries of Service The US Army, 1775-2004. 2004. 
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These are not particularly “inventive” applications of airpower, but 
the possibility that allies could be conducting these operations with a high degree 
of success, rather than the US, would be a revolutionary political and military 
gain for America. 
Where Gray’s model can be applied, it seems to be unambiguous 
on how it treats this issue: FID, A-FID, and even AA-FID, make sense. The 
policy, strategy, politics, objectives, alternatives, technology, competence, 
flexibility, vulnerability, and other Gray features imply an “opportunity to extract 
strategic utility”. But that conclusion must be weighed against what Gray would 
highlight as shortfalls. Problems highlighted by the Gray analysis will be 
discussed in the final section. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
It still seems reasonable to conclude that aviation attack FID has strategic 
utility, but it also seems clear the path has some serious obstacles. America’s 
own use of airpower is essential to its prosecution of low intensity conflict 
operations. Operations such as Son Tay, Just Cause, OEF or the UAV attack in 
Yemen were dependent on the ability to project firepower from the air. The 
advent of the GWOT has both constricted and expanded the battlespace into 
which attack aviation assets might be utilized. However, the issue is not only 
what the U.S. can do, it is also what can U.S. allies do with attack aviation 
assets. Thus far it does not seem reasonable to conclude that there is no 
capacity for the use of these skills; but the next question that must be asked is, 
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IV. THE DEMAND FOR FASTMOVERS 
There is a critical air power component to SORE [Special 
Operations Regional Engagement] that the Air force Must prepare 
itself to meet. Many first- and second-wave entities will face threats 
to their internal security that may require the proper use of air 
power. The fledgling air forces of these entities will require 
assistance in developing adequate tactics, procedures, 
maintenance, supply, and other support systems within their own 
technological imitations. 
- USAF 2025112
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In theory, empirical data could be some of the best evidence to support 
the demand for aviation attack related FID missions around the world. The intent 
would be that a review of foreign requests for aid would show that there are a 
small but statistically significant number of requests made each year by U.S. 
friends and allies for assistance in aviation attack related roles, but that the U.S. 
denies those requests as there is currently no formal capability to offer this type 
of assistance. Although the U.S. does provide aircraft, and in select scenarios 
accompanies those sales with some “spin up” training, there is no cadre of 
personnel organized, trained, equipped and designated to provide FID type 
training in aviation attack related skill sets, especially in a fighter CAS type 
scenario or in any antiquated type aircraft that typifies the Air Forces of small, 
lesser developed nations.  Several major issues impede data collection of this 
nature. 
First, informal foreign requests for military assistance and training from the 
U.S. arrive via many channels; soldier to soldier while abroad, diplomat to 
diplomat at social events, or General to General at conferences, as possible 
examples. But regardless of their point of origination, official requests eventually 
funnel through to the Department of State. But even then, the process is only 
formalized when the likelihood of any meaningful interaction appears to be high. 
 
112 “Air Force 2025”. Air University. Vol 3, Chapter 10.  
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Thus casual requests and inquiries for support of an activity for which the U.S. 
does not routinely provide support may be legitimately dismissed, and no data 
collected on the request (i.e. that nation X asked for training in CAS in 2004).113 
Similarly, Combatant Commanders could make requests for training in their 
theater as well, but these requests only exist in consolidation if they were 
approved. All of the “not appropriate”, “disapproved”, and “don’t have the funds” 
cases disappeared when the requesting official wadded up his notes and threw 
them in a trash can. So the first obstacle is that if the U.S. did not actually provide 
aid to the nation, no formal records exist. 
Second, there is an unwritten policy that the U.S. does not provide this 
type of assistance. None of the major U.S. Acts (Arms Export Control Act of 
1976, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, FY 2002 Foreign Operations 
Appropriations, Freedom Support Act, International Code of Conduct in FY2000 
Omnibus Appropriations Act, Defense Department Appropriations FY 2002) or 
international agreements (OSCE Document on Small Arms, Program of Action 
from the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms) specifically 
prohibit the transfer of offensive skills or equipment.114 Many of these documents 
make reference to the caution required when the exchange of lethal capabilities 
are entailed, or outright restrictions if the target nation is non-compliant with 
certain actions (such as supporting terrorism), but none actually constrain what 
can be transferred. In line with this logic, the U.S. tends to restrict the transfer of 
offensive related skills and equipment to nations with which it has a close bond, 
and maintains a closer hold on those technologies and equipment that have 
greater lethal capabilities. Thus countries such as the United Kingdom are more 
likely to be recipients of this type of assistance than Bangladesh, and a combat 
rifle is more likely to be transferred than an F-16.  
As aviation tends to fall into both the high technology and high lethality 
category, actual cases of military assistance in aviation attack roles are very 
 
113 Non-attributable interview, Department of State, 25 February 2005. 
114 There is a further list of restrictions on what can be transferred, usually as a function of 
what technology is being exported. But with regards to the type of exchanges being discussed in 
this research, those restrictions are non limiting. 
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few.115 Thus there exists a general perception by foreign governments/militaries 
that there is no need to even ask for this type of training/assistance, because aid 
of this nature will not be provided.116 Coupled together, these facets create an 
absence of data, and outside of polling foreign nations individually, this leaves 
little ability to determine empirically who and how many of U.S.’s allies desire 
assistance in this manner.117
B. ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE 
Whereas the previous section was meant to capture hard data, numbers, 
records, and case reports, this section is intended to determine the soft data: the 
informal and word of mouth evidence of a need for AA-FID. The pool of potential 
anecdotal evidence is large, as many individuals, from the youngest Marine in 
Afghanistan to the most senior members of the DoS have the opportunity to 
collect informal indications that U.S. allies want or could use attack aviation aid. 
But because of the diversity of potential collection sources, it is unreasonable 
within the scope of this study to survey them; with one exception.  
The 6 SOS is a team of aviation trained individuals who work with many 
key nations around the world at the tactical, operational and strategic level. As 
such they provide an essential and valuable source audience which is particularly 
 
115 Data on this topic is difficult to locate, for reasons previously discussed. But this author 
found no evidence that outside of a coalition activity has the U.S. in the last 30 years provided 
unilateral training on “troops in contact” type, air-to-ground attack roles from a fixed forward firing 
asset. 
116 Although there is no formal documentation as to this point, several individuals interviewed 
in the 6 SOS echoed the sentiment that they had experienced this type of reaction from their host 
nation peers while abroad on FID missions. 
117 Although not included specifically as part of this research, this author finds it odd that the 
type of anecdotal evidence suggested above is not cataloged by the Department of State. The 
amount of effort to collect and maintain this type of information seems at first glance to be 
minimal. But the potential benefit of being able to make observations and conclusions from a long 
history of statistical evidence across a whole range of informal requests seems proportionally 
large when compared to the actual costs. 
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appreciative and retentive of these types of facts. The following data was 
collected in interviews with key senior individuals in the 6 SOS.118
 
Nation Aircraft 119 Mission *,**120
Philippines 121 OV-10, SM-79 CAS 
Sri Lanka 122 KFir, Su-27 Interdiction, CAS 
Columbia OV-10, AC-47, A-37 COINI, CAS 
Iraq 123 New Air Force  
                                            
118 The interview questions included: “Since 2000, in nations you have worked with, have 
you ever…1) Been approached by a host nation individual about the possibility of providing any 
type of aviation attack role assistance? 2) Had a host nation individual discuss their shortfalls in 
aviation attack roles? 3) Witnessed a host nation inappropriately using available aviation attack 
assets? 4) Witnessed a host nation not using available attack aviation assets when in your 
opinion it would have been appropriate? 5) Considered shortfalls in a host nation’s capability as it 
applies to aviation attack roles? Each bullet is not meant to be encompassing of the interview 
conducted. But rather to quickly encapsulating the interviewee’s perception regarding the specific 
nation and attack aviation issue. Various senior members of the 6 SOS, personal interviews 
conducted between 25-28 January 2005. 
119 Aircraft and Mission are only listed if specifically referred to by the interviewee. If not 
listed, the comment may provide explanatory remarks as to what context the interviewee saw a 
relation to the issue of aviation attack resources, otherwise the interviewee did not comment on 
assets or roles. 
120 Although Counter Insurgency (COIN), and Counter Terrorism (CT) are not specifically 
aviation missions they imply the opportunity to employ aviation assets as part of that nations 
operations against the insurgency. They are listed here as a broad category because the 
interviewee saw the respective national strategy (CT or COIN) as a prospective application of AA 
missions. 
121 In the Philippines (PI), a typical tactic would be for terror/insurgent forces to attack PI 
forces, and upon retreat, lure them into a counter attack. On the counterattack, army ground 
forces would be ambushed, and request air support (OV-10). The OV-10 Broncos would not 
respond due to a known lack of capabilities, proficiency, and poor A/G connectivity. In scenarios 
where OV-10 pilots believed they could contribute to the mission and survive the operation, they 
would “randomly” bomb inside the designated 1:50 grid square, as that was the maximum 
efficacy of their attack tactics. 
122 Manpad threats from Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have devastated the Sri 
Lankan Air Force due to lack of equipment, training and tactics. If Sri Lanka is to continue using 
FM assets against the Tamil Tigers, they desperately need assistance oriented towards the 
proper tactic, techniques and procedures to increase the survivability of their fast-mover 
platforms. Platforms currently possessed are inadequate for the kind of roles/support needed in 
theater. Indicative of a common theme; a need to re-orient thinking away from a “throw whatever 
we have at them” towards “what is needed”. 
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Afghanistan 126 New Air Force  
Thailand OV-10, A-37, F-5, COIN 
Indonesia OV-10, A-4 CT, COIN, CAS 
Laos Mi-8  
Cambodia Mi-8  
Vietnam Mi-24, Mi-8  
Korea  CAS 
Bangladesh   
Nepal  CT 
India   
Pakistan  COIN, CT, CAS 
Figure 2.   Potential Training Partners: Interviews with CAAs 
 
This listing could be considerably more valuable if the context of each 
reference was known. For example, if President Kumaratunga of Sri Lanka had 
specifically asked the Commander of the 6 SOS for assistance to better utilize 
their KFir aircraft in Close Air Support roles against the LTTE rebels, then that 
data could be held as having a higher value than a CAA who happened to notice 
that Indonesian A-4s sat unused on the Indonesian tarmac.  But in an effort to 
maintain confidentiality with regards to specific details about each nation’s force 
structure and security issues, no such breakout exists here.  
While some of the references in Table 1 do reflect nation’s direct requests 
for assistance, others are, as this category implies, purely anecdotal. Although 
this data cannot be used to make specific conclusions regarding the exact 
demands of the international community for AA mission assistance, this 
information does indicate that at least on an informal level there exists the 
capacity for development in this area.  
 
                                            
123 Both of these nations are building an AF from the ground up, and are receiving ad-hoc 
assets from various nations. Both require a more thought out process for what aircraft they 
include in their new air force. Additionally, anti-terrorist and COIN roles may be significant for 
them in the future, so if the argument of this document is followed, they will need AA-FID type 
support, and introducing that capability from the start with the correct assets is likely to be far 
more beneficial than trying to establish those capabilities at a later date. The topic of the future of 
the Afghani and Iraqi Air Force could constitute a thesis unto itself. The conclusion that they need 
a fast-mover COIN capability is certainly debatable, but it seems reasonable that a COIN 
capability would certainly be of more value that providing them with a front-line air-to-air 
capability. For further reading on this topic, see February 2005, 
<http://strategypage.com/dls/articles/200413.asp>. 
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C. PEDAGOGICAL EVIDENCE 
Next, a departure from the observation of data points (whether they be 
“hard” or “soft” information) to the theoretical description of the potential 
application of AA-FID. Recent recognition of the contributions of the 6 SOS to 
current political and military strategies, directed the squadron to investigate the 
utility of expanding their force structure. The team designated to conduct that 
investigation ultimately concluded that the addition of fixed-wing attack assets 
was worth further/future consideration, but not within the temporal scope of their 
current research and recommendations.  Data collected for this study though, 
does include much relevant information towards the question of AA-FID. 
The team developed a list of priority countries to analyze. The list of 
countries was generated from a weighted list of factors that ranged from each 
nation’s will to participate in coalition goals to the importance of that nation in the 
GWOT, as ranked by a U.S. government agency. Thirty one nations made the 
listing, which were then cataloged by the air assets that those nations used to 
contribute to GWOT related tasks. Twenty four different type of fixed wing assets 
were identified among those 31 nation’s primary assets, of which 8 are attack 
platforms. Those 8, and number of times they appeared among the 31 countries 
were;  
• Aero L-39 (9) 
• Su-25 Frogfoot (5) 
• OV-10 Bronco (4) 
• Mirage (4) 
• Tucano T-6 (3) 
• F-5 (3) 
• Alpha Jet (2) 
• OA-37 (1) 
 There were 98 total references to the 24 different aircraft in 31 countries, 
the instances of the attack aircraft numbered 31, which is almost a third of the 
total number surveyed (See Table 2).124
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Figure 3.   Potential Training Partners: Mission Types by Asset (6 SOS MATS)125 
 
The specific significance of this data is not overwhelmingly unambiguous, 
but it certainly suggests that the nations America most desires/needs to interact 
with have the capability to use AA assets as part of their national strategy. This 
suggests an avenue that the U.S. can exploit to magnify the effectiveness of 
allies actions, which marries well with previous discussions concerning the 
potential benefits of attack aviation assets.  
Former commander of the 6 SOS and current airpower theorists, Colonel 
Brozenick, conducted a review of the types of missions requested for foreign 
aviation training, and built the following list of high demand missions. (See Fig 4). 
                                            
124 6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisor Mission Analysis Team. “Anticipated Growth of the 
Combat Aviation Advisor Mission.” 22 December 04. Official Use Only. 
125 6th SOS Combat Aviation Advisor Mission Analysis Team. “Anticipated Growth of the 




Figure 4.   High Demand Foreign Aviation Training (Brozenick)126 
 
Of the 12 mission types he identified as “high demand”, eight are physical 
aviation operations (as opposed to the remaining four air support missions). Of 
those eight, half (or a third of all mission types) involve employing ordnance and 
or weapons. Some of those roles the 6 SOS has made forays into, such as door 
mounted guns on UH-1N Huey helicopters, which could be used for armed escort 
duties. But by and large, the 6th has not focused, trained and equipped to 
address a major portion of the skills sets identified as most in demand. 
D. REAL-WORLD EVIDENCE 
This last category is meant to capture current data that attack aviation 
assets are being (or have been) used successfully as part of many nations’ 
tactics versus insurgent, rebel and terrorists forces. Many of these contemporary 
examples have already been highlighted in other places within this study, such 
                                            
126 Norman J. Brozenick Jr., “Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations.” 
June 2002. p 22. 
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as the Philippines, Yemen and Afghanistan cases. Several other modern  
examples include the takedown of Mohammad Atef (the number three leader of 
al Qaeda) by a Predator UAV in November 2001, a U.S. warplane attack on al 
Qaeda operatives that took out Juma Namangani (military leader of the IMU, and 
ally of al Qaeda ) also in November 2001, another successful Predator attack on 
Nek Mohammad (pro-al Qaeda Pakistani militant) in June of 2004, and the 
Israelis have provided several successful case studies over the last 20 years.127
The unsuccessful air strikes on al Qaeda training camps in the Pakistani 
desert in 1998 that reportedly missed Osama bin Ladin by only a couple of hours, 
serves well to highlight the strengths and weakness of airpower.128 Airpower 
definitively has the capacity to deliver focused firepower to remote or difficult to 
access locations, but in this example the importance of timely actionable 
intelligence is seen. The other “show stopper” is collateral damage. Especially as 
society has progressed to accepting less and less unnecessary bloodshed in the 
execution of combat, the potential for unintended or uncontrolled damage to 
elements besides the target, has become markedly more unacceptable. 
Numerous examples can be found indicating that a strike failed because of 
poor/old intelligence or never executed for concerns over collateral damage. 
These issues present real obstacles for the effective implementation of the roles 
and missions discussed herein, but are mentioned in this section to highlight the 
number of instances in which airpower had a contributory role to make, yet 
abstained due to some application shortfall.  
But the successes have not been limited to the post 9/11 environment. In 
“Airpower in Small Wars”, James Corum and Wray Johnson provide a 
comprehensive look at the history of airpower in other than major conflicts. 
Starting at its inception, across a broad spectrum of adversaries (insurgents, 
rebels, factions, and terrorists) and in nations all around the globe, Corum and 
Johnson aspire to derive the utility of air power when applied in these “small 
 
127 Christopher Bolkom, and Katzman Kenneth. “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for 
Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. CRS Report for Congress. 24, January 2005. p 12-16. 
128 Christopher Bolkom, and Katzman Kenneth. “Military Aviation: Issues and Options for 
Combating Terrorism and Insurgency”. CRS Report for Congress. 24, January 2005. p 13. 
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wars”. The examples cover from aviation’s cradle to the modern time and include 
a wide diversity of case studies; rebel Moroccan tribes, the Greek Civil War, the 
Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South 
Vietnam (pre-U.S. escalation), counterinsurgencies in southern Africa, Latin 
American counter guerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorist campaigns in the Middle East over the last four decades to name 
a few.129
To be sure, not all of these cases they reviewed were successes, but their 
data simply shows that across the history and application of airpower as it relates 
to usage in small wars, there have be tactical successes and strategic utility. The 
authors round out the spectrum of the applicability of airpower in unconventional 
operations by showing that although time does wax and wane the specific utility 
of specific types of air applications, over the long haul, airpower has and 
continues to provide contributive avenues to these small wars. As such, it 
logically follows that a demand will continue to exist for the known mechanisms 
of applying airpower as well as quests to discover new tasks and missions. 
Author Timothy Thomas used the conflict in Chechnya as a case study of 
the effectiveness of airpower in low intensity conflicts, and concludes a similar 
discrepancy between effectiveness and the associated hazards of employment. 
The air force had a golden opportunity in Chechnya to see that 
airpower cannot invariably work its reputed magic in circumstances 
where the target set is elusive, problems predominate in target 
location and identification and there is an ever-present danger of 
unintended harm to noncombatants.130
The experience of air combat operations in the Chechen conflict 
demonstrated the increased role of close air support to ground 
troops. The participation of attack helicopters in it was limited, and 
front fighters and bombers could not operate effectively at low 
altitudes and so were not used due to their high airspeed and the 
shortage of time to search for targets, aim and employ 
 
129 James S. Corum, and Wray R Johnson. Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and 
Terrorists. 2003.
130 Benjamin S.Lambeth, “Russia's air war in Chechnya”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 
October 1996. p 33. 
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weapons….This is why the SU-25C—a small, subsonic, reliable 
and maneuverable aircraft of simple design with a good view from 
the pilot cockpit—basically was used to support ground troops and 
for ground-attack operations….Moreover, it has powerful 
armament, rather reliable navigation and targeting avionics, and 
armor protection and can operate both from airstrips and an 
artificial surface as well as from dirt airstrips.131
Lastly, Dr. Thomas Searle, military defense analyst with the Airpower 
Research Institute, noted the successful use of airpower by civilian contractors in 
Africa and South America for patrolling insurgent/guerrilla favored targets, such 
as pipelines, in the vast largely uninhabited regions of those countries. 
Additionally, these contract security firms were able to achieve success rates 
comparable to nation’s possessing modern air forces performing similar roles. 
Most significantly they used inexpensive niche platforms such as O-2s, T-6s and 
AT-37’s modestly outfitted with several modern upgrades (such as GPS and  
FLIR). Because of the low cost of these assets, they were able to provide 
relatively large numbers of these “very effective counterguerrila platforms”. 132
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This data is not overwhelmingly convincing for the demand of aviation 
attack related skill sets by U.S. allies. And unfortunately the one data source that 
may have been able to validate or invalidate the demand, does not maintain the 
requisite data. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, these four data sources do imply 
a definitive trend that suggests the demand exists, but probably at a relatively 
unrecognized and unactualized level. In short, 1) the legacy of use of aviation 
attack missions outside of conventional operations, 2) coupled with leading 
thinkers concept of operations (CONOPS) for these assets, 3) reinforced by 
contemporary examples and 4) further substantiated by informal data from 
professionals working hand-in-hand with U.S. allies seems to be subtly 
compelling that the demand for these skill sets is actually quite robust and likely 
to remain so.  
 
131 Viktor Bezborodov. “The Su-25: A Formidable Aircraft”. Armeyskiy Sbornik. no. 8. 20 July 
1995. pp 34-35.  
132 Thomas R. Searle. “Making Airpower Effective Against Guerrillas”. Air and Space Power 
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V. PROBLEMS AND PATHS 
Maybe its time we went “retro” to a simpler, fixed-wing A-1 
SkyRaider, OV-1 Mohawk or A-37 Dragonfly type aircraft. 
[the A-37] could fly slow enough with a second seat observer to act 
as a defacto AFAC [Airborne Forward Air Controller] to spot the 
enemy accurately, it can [also] fly very fast. The A-37 can penetrate 
enemy air defenses at least as well as other unstealthy non-
supersonic aircraft can, which all aircraft are when they carry 
bombs on external racks. The A-37 only weighs 6,000 pounds itself 
yet can carry a 9,000 pound ordnance load! The A-37 is thus fast, 
slow when it has to be, safe, easy to maintain and operate, durable, 
and available now at zero cost. 
- Project AFAC Dragonfly133
It is only necessary for SORE operators to be familiar with the 
overall characteristics of aircraft flow in the regional area of 
responsibility. It is not necessary for them to be qualified in all 
aircraft in the region. Subsequently, SORE aviation units need only 
possess aircraft that closely resemble the characteristics of aviation 
platforms in that geographic area. 
- USAF 2025134
A. PROBLEMS 
Following the arguments posited thus far, the author suggests that U.S. 
doctrine and policy direct a mode of international cooperation of which the tool of 
foreign internal defense is a natural and logical consequence. Furthermore, 
academic discussion on this topic supports and reinforces that view. Additionally, 
that aviation FID as a sub-component of FID in general, holds the same value 
potential, but with in a decidedly more narrow construct, and that aviation attack 
FID also possesses the uniquely powerful features of general FID, but only within 
a very discrete range of well thought out and crafted applications. Lastly, that 
those who utilize airpower, both within the United States and in allied nations, 
recognize and desire the capabilities that aviation attack skills can contribute to 
 
133 Project AFAC – Dragonfly”. 20 January 2005. p 5. 
134 “Air Force 2025”. Air University. Vol 3, Chapter 10. 
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their political and military efforts, especially as it applies to the global war on 
terror. But this path also carries its fair share of hazards. 
The implementation of AA-FID is obstructed by the problems associated 
with its realization; listed below are the shortfalls, obstacles and operational 
issues illuminated by this research. In the subsequent section, paths and 
approaches to mitigate these problems will be discussed. 
• POLMIL leaders are uneducated as to what FID can and cannot do, 
and are thus prone to inappropriately use (or not use) FID. 
• The US cannot ensure that the host nation will use the capabilities give 
them, for purposes the U.S. approves of.  
• Foreign air forces cannot maintain an operations tempo appropriate to 
sustain the tactics the U.S. would offer them. 
• Current conflicts are increasingly urban, and aviation attack missions 
are poorly suited to that role. 
• There is no universal platform available for maintaining AA-FID skill 
sets for U.S. aircrews. 
• AA-FID operations lack strategic and tactical guidance.  
• When FID operations become successful, they tend to be taken over 
by people/organizations who do not understand their value or how to 
effectively use them.  
•   A-FID personnel have not been well trained in the past, or “off the 
street” personnel have been used in the absence of FID specific 
personnel. 




Despite these challenges the future of AA-FID is not an impossible 
objective. Rather, recognition of the hazards can only serve to better understand 
AA-FID’s strengths and weaknesses so as to facilitate success. Many operations 
both in the military and civil world entail risks, yet the U.S. accepts that managing 
the potential pitfalls can make the risk acceptable given the probable outcomes. 
For example, many nations use espionage as a tool of statecraft, and the risk 
associated with those actions can be exorbitant. Yet means are found to mitigate 
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the risk, and thereby make the outcome commensurate or greater than the 
potential loss. So should be the fate for attack aviation FID.  
In 2004 U.S. Special Operations soldiers acquired the legal authority to 
distribute cash and equipment to individuals who aid U.S. efforts against 
terrorists and other targets. This role, traditionally held exclusively by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), has been controversial, with even supporters worrying 
“that it could be used to fund and arm unsavory foreign elements that might later 
use their U.S.-provided weapons and equipment against American interests.” 135  
“In the right circumstances, like Iraq and Afghanistan, this makes sense….In the 
wrong circumstances it could lead us into some pretty bad stuff.”136 Using a 
similar argument, the material that follows is this authors attempt to demarcate 
the “makes sense” from the “pretty bad stuff” outcomes. These recommended 
approaches for breaching specific issues that present obstacles to AA-FID 
implementation and operation could do much to ensure that success is the norm 
for AA-FID employment. The problems and recommendations are broken down 
into three categories: doctrine/strategy, operational and tactical. 
1. Doctrine/Strategy 
Issues discussed within this context are those that at some key point 
require that at least conventional wisdom, if not actual action, must take place 
above the Air Force level. Until key political and military thinkers “buy in” to these 
concepts, FID operations in general, and AA-FID specifically is likely to continue 
to face the particular problem being addressed. 
a. Pre-existing Capability 
FID is not like traditional special operations, where a short diligent 
planning cycle can lead to operations and attainment of the desired objective the 
next hour, next day or next week. FID operations take time to achieve their 
desired result. On the short end of the time scale, a couple of weeks may be  
 
 
135 Greg Miller. “Special Forces Enter CIA Territory with a New Weapon”. October 31, 2004. 
136 Greg Miller. “Special Forces Enter CIA Territory with a New Weapon”. October 31, 2004. 
Quoting an anonymous Congressman. 
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enough to “spin up” a host nation in an important skill set, but typically several 
visits and joint/combined linked exercises are required to adequately foment the 
lessons. 
This is only possible when a robust FID organization is already in 
motion. The actions required to indigenously develop culturally aware, 
linguistically astute, mission experts can take months to years. These issues are 
especially true with regards to aviation assets, due to their increased complexity, 
support structure and the inherent risks. It is imperative that if FID is considered a 
“value added” tactic, that major categories of FID application be brought on-line 
well before their specific need is anticipated. This concept of “reacting” versus 
“planning” can be clearly illustrated in the short history of FID operations.  
When the U.S. helped Morocco in the 1970’s with the sales of 
aircraft and training provided by American pilots, the U.S. got only half of the 
equation correct. Even though the aircrews were well trained and professional, 
they were limited by their lack of “indigenous” skills and a well crafted CONOPS 
to support them. These limitations negatively affected the overall mission, and 
were contributory to its shortcomings.137 Whereas numerous recent 6 SOS 
operations can be used as comparison models, where each case shows that the 
preparedness of the mission in general, and the people specifically, is a crucial 
factor in defining the legitimacy and capability of crews downrange, and thusly 
the overall efficacy of the mission as a whole.  
To “stand up” an entirely new FID capability to meet a new threat 
significantly diminishes its capability. Strategic thinkers must continuously 
evaluate what skills the U.S. may want to bequeath to its allies, and 
develop/maintain airmen with those (or complementary) skill sets ahead of time. 
Within closely related proficiencies, some ad-libbing is possible, and is actually a 
fundamental strength of a professional FID organization. The call to “spin up” an 
organization (much less a helicopter or transport pilot) to instruct in Close Air 
Support or the Killer Scout role, cannot occur on the kind of timeline that the 
 
137 David J. Dean, “The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict”. 1986. p. 65-69. 
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recognition for such training usually requires. Thus, even if AA-FID is seen as 
being a valuable tactic, but within a narrow window of applicability, to not prepare 
a small core of personnel and equipment now, means the capability will not be 
available when it is called for. 
b. Ensuring Compliance 
Ensuring the training/skills/equipment offered to the host nation are 
used appropriately is a topic is of monumental concern to political leadership, yet 
despite the magnitude of this issue, it can be reasonably addressed. The political 
system needs to find stronger bonds through which to tie assistance offered to 
U.S. allies. Take the Pakistan example presented previously where the U.S. has 
promised to provide F-16s to that nation. If America’s intent was to provide a 
mechanism for the Pakistanis to better execute the war on terror, then there 
could be political dangers if Pakistan instead used those assets to balance the 
Indian threat. Whatever asset is provided to Pakistan, the U.S. needs to carefully 
consider the potential short and long term possibilities of capable/modern attack 
aircraft residing with Pakistan. Assuming whatever the U.S. might provide is 
focused on GWOT type ends, America must implement safeguards to minimize 
the potential misapplication of those assets. Conceptually, this author could 
imagine an agreement that stipulates that ANY use of these assets and related 
skill sets (within some defined timeline, say the next 25 years), east of the Indus 
river would result in immediate cessation of all aid, adoption of U.S. support of 
Indian claims in Kashmir, and possibly even deportation of Pakistani nationals 
from the U.S. The example is notably draconian, but it seems clear that a deft 
political negotiating team could devise appropriate (yet still strong) consequences 
for the breach of this agreement. It might be reasoned that nations that believed 
the punishment too great probably would not have U.S. interests in mind in the 
long run, (why else be concerned with the consequences, if it was a deal you 
didn’t plan on breaking) and thus should not be party to the technology 
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transfer.138 Of course, various factors within the nation should reasonably be 
considered when drafting the restrictions, but Pakistan presents a good example 
of where it appears to be in America’s interest to provide them aid, but also wise 
to consider the likelihood and consequences of their defection from U.S. 
interests.  
Conversely though, if the American intent was to simultaneously 
insert a “balancing” influence in the region by providing Pakistan with the same 
generation air assets that India owns, while reaping the potential benefits of a 
modern asset to assist in the GWOT, the potential for abuse may be minimized. 
Most any action the Pakistan air force might take with their new aircraft, as long 
as it was not inherently “anti-humanitarian” could fall under either of the accepted 
premises of the reasons America offered the assets in the first place: versus 
terrorists or to oppose Indian actions. 
Section four of the Arms Export Control Act stipulates that U.S. 
defense articles and services be offered only to friendly countries, for use only in 
legitimate self defense, internal security or for the purposes of U.N. sanctioned 
actions to restore peace. Under section three of that same act, if the President 
determines that a substantial abuse of the agreement has occurred, then a wide 
range of punitive options can be invoked. Since the rewrite of the arms export 
laws in 1976, neither the President nor Congress has ever determined that a 
violation has occurred. In four cases (Argentina, Indonesia, Turkey and Israel) 
restrictive trade actions have been emplaced for lesser violations of the trade 
agreements. Without investigating the exact circumstances of each of these 
cases, this suggests that for political reasons it has been undesirable to 
completely “punish” nations that have betrayed U.S. trust. This also implies that 
were current/future administrations willing to truly hold nations accountable, a 
potential wider range of countries could be recipients of assistance, but only in 
 
138 Not to be completely naïve about the nature of such negotiations, certainly some 
countries would be concerned that the US was using the agreement as future leverage to inflict 
sanctions and strong-arm the country in question. But despite the challenges, it should be 
possible to find a middle-ground with allies, where the U.S. retains certain legal/fiscal leverage 
that the target country will not abuse U.S. trust. 
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light of the knowledge that the U.S. had full intent to bring the whole array of 
disciplinary actions on that nation, should they renege on the terms of the 
agreement 139. 
c. Operations Tempo 
The inability of many host nations to be able to maintain an 
operations tempo conducive for sustaining advanced attack aviation skills is a 
daunting obstacle, but one that is essential that the U.S. consider when providing 
assistance. Potential allies fall into one of three general categories with respect 
to this issue: robust, mediocre or frail. For those nations that can maintain a 
robust operations tempo, there are few concerns as to whether their new skills 
will “wither on the vine”, but typically nations that fall into this category tend to 
already be tactically savvy, and thus are apt not to need aid via the FID 
mechanism.140 Mediocre nations are those that for a small U.S. investment 
(man-power, equipment and/or money) could be capable of sustaining a tactical 
flying program, and thus represent good training partner candidates.141 Lastly are 
the frail air forces that would require substantial assistance to maintain any kind 
of tactical flying hour program, which unfortunately is where many of America’s 
target allies lie.142  
Before investing in either mediocre or frail air forces, it is essential 
that thorough research and government-to-government talks occur, in order to 
ensure that funds are being appropriately spent, and that the host nation has a 
commensurate understanding of America’s expectations. In these situations the 
U.S. needs to engage more than just the FID process; SA to provide equipment, 
possible FMS for other military items, Excess Defense Articles transfers, FID for 
the actual tactics, then IMET programs involving joint operations of both the U.S. 
and host nation, to maintain the skill sets. In the short run, this may mean a fewer 
 
139 Richard Grimmett. “U.S. Defense Articles and Services Supplied to Foreign Recipients: 
Restrictions on Their Use.” CRS Report to Congress, 14 March 2005. pp. 1-4. 
140 The “1st World”; Western Europe, Canada, Israel, Japan, Australia, Singapore, and 
others. 
141 Under-funded, under-equipped, or under-trained, yet motivated nations; Indonesia, 
Philippines, Jordan, Morocco, Peru, or Bolivia. 
142 Many “3rd World” nations; much of Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Burma. 
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number of partners receiving more assistance, but in the long run that should 
translate into allies with bona fide capabilities, and not merely the appearance of 
competence. In the absence of deliberately crafted aid programs, the U.S. is 
potentially throwing away time and money. With smart and focused planning 
America not only maximizes the odds that allies will be effective, but also 
conserves its own limited resources. 
2. Operational 
Operational level issues are aimed at concerns and/or actions that need 
reconciliation at the service and/or command level. These concerns do not 
require attention at the national level, but are beyond the ability of individual 
functional units to adequately address. 
a. FID Savvy POLMIL 
Solving the problem of uneducated POLMIL leaders on the military 
side of this issue is not difficult. The Air Force needs experts on FID, available to 
initially brief Combatant Commanders and eventually to serve on their staffs to 
provide full time advice as subject matter experts. Although A-FID cadre as a 
whole are a small population, time will expand the number of individuals with 
direct A-FID experience, who in turn can serve as a pool of candidates to fill 
these positions. The continued efficacy of A-FID operations should reinforce the 
value of A-FID, and in turn buttress the importance of having an A-FID expert on 
planning teams and senior staffs.  
To directly educate the political side of the house is a more difficult 
task, but the process of bringing Combatant Commanders on board is one 
avenue to spread the correct message up the chain. Again, successes of 
individual A-FID operations will highlight their capabilities and contributions and 
cause civilian leadership to ask more questions about this field, at which point 
FID experts and educated senior military leadership can champion the cause of 
A-FID, while at the same time imparting valuable knowledge on its strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Conversely, the opposite is true as well, but this is all the more 
reason for there to exist a cadre of A-FID experts outside of the 6 SOS. These 
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specialists can serve as the link to explain how/why particular operations did not 
meet all objectives, and increase the expectancy of efficacy the next time by 
providing an essential link between the leadership and the operators. To date, 6 
SOS deployments have been predominately “success stories”, with several 
having been pivotal in simply highlighting the squadron’s existence. More 
importantly, these events have resulted in a broader knowledge base of the 
nation’s military options and in several cases, a decision to invest more into the 
A-FID mechanism. 
As one last example of the type of issues A-FID cadre members 
could address in their role as subject matter experts, Colonel Wray Johnson 
neatly summarized in an article titled “Ends Versus Means: The 6th Special 
Operations Squadron and the Icarus Syndrome”, how the senior leadership in 
some regards has come to acknowledge and respect FID as a capability, yet 
their treatment of the aircraft issue shows a failure to fundamentally understand 
the strengths of the capability: 
Focusing on mission and strategy requirements, AFSOC FID 
planners advocated the procurement of airplanes ideally suited to 
the aviation-FID mission; however, these aircraft were rejected 
because they did not comport with the acceptable notion of a front-
line weapon system. Consequently, the Mission Need Statement 
justifying "a family of Air Force, FID-specific aircraft" was rejected 
by USSOCOM in 1993 and no aircraft were programmed for what 
was ostensibly a "flying" special operations squadron. Adding insult 
to injury, 6 SOS designers were accused of attempting to create a 
"flying club," owing to the "off-the-shelf" and "low-tech" nature of the 
airplanes requested. And yet every Commander-in-Chief of US 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) since 1990 and a 
succession of AFSOC commanders have validated the concept of 
aviation-FID as originally articulated, and reams of studies have 
demonstrated conclusively that simple, inexpensive, reliable, and 
"alternative technology" platforms are best suited for the aviation-
FID mission.143
Assuming Colonel Johnson’s observations are accurate (which is in 
line with observations highlighted with interviews of 6 SOS personnel), then the 
 
143 Wray Johnson.“Ends Versus Means: The 6th Special Operations Squadron and the 
Icarus Syndrome”. Air and Space Power Chronicles. 12 January 2000. 
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6th could provide the requisite knowledge base to help leaders bridge the gap 
between the perception of aviation FID as a powerful tool and the reality of its 
implementation. 
b. Doctrinally Flexible Air Force 
More so than the other services, the Air Force has relied on and 
ridden the back of technology as a mainstay of both progress and capabilities. 
Occasionally the service is lamented in its quest for technology regardless of 
whether the advance meets the needs of the present. The current arguments for 
and against the F-22 are typical of this debate, where the Air Force advocates 
that success tends to be a function of staying ahead of adversaries with the latest 
capabilities and technologies, and then chooses to remove from service the older 
asset for which the new was developed to replace (the F-15 in this case.) 
Whereas opponents may be willing to recognize the benefits of technological 
advances, but believe the costs of pursuing a pure advanced technological 
strategy conflicts with more appropriate ways in which to fight present 
conflicts.144
To a greater degree, the Air Force seems very reticent to recognize 
the utility of modes of operation that are more than a platform-generation old. 
DoD strategist and war gamer James Dunnigan commented on how the United 
States Air Force might view Afghani acquisition of foreign made light/attack 
aircraft as the mainstay of their new air force: 
These ‘trainer/light attack aircraft’ can also operate from crude 
airports, or even a stretch of highway. Aircraft like this can carry 
systems to defeat portable surface to air missiles. They can carry 
smart bombs as well. But from the U.S. Air Force point of view, 
there are several problems with these aircraft. First, none of these 
aircraft are made in the United States, so Congress will not be 
happy about U.S. tax dollars buying non-American warplanes. 





144 To complete the example, opponents might argue that since conventional air-to-air 
battles appear to no longer be part of the spectrum of modern conflicts, no new air-to-air fighters 
are necessary, or a simple upgrade of the F-15 would be sufficient. 
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Finally, the air force doesn't want something like this to succeed in 
Afghanistan and raise questions about U.S. Air Force tactics and 
buying decisions. 145  
In a 21st century vision statement for AFSOC, Lieutenant Colonel 
Dredla identified one of the four pillars of AFSOC as “must remain low-tech to 
deal with the majority of host nation air forces that are not on the same 
technological plane as the USAF.”146  Yet there remains a trend to ignore this 
type of advice; such as the decision the Air Force almost made to remove A-10’s 
from service. “With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, the Soviet threat seemingly 
disappeared, and the US began to downsize its military forces. Among the Air 
Force's early contributions to this downsizing was the projected mothballing of its 
entire A-10 fleet.”147  Just as that process was gaining momentum, the A-10s 
were rushed to southwest Asia to meet the needs of Operation Desert Storm. 
“Effective against Iraqi tanks and other ground vehicles, these aircraft exceeded 
both the Air Force's and their designer's expectations.30 In addition, the flexibility 
and ruggedness of the A-10 allowed it to perform a wide range of missions for 
which it was not designed--such as suppression of enemy air defenses, armed 
reconnaissance, and armed escort for search and rescue.”148 Had the Gulf War 
taken place only a year later, the Air Force would have had to recall these assets 
from a mothball status.  
This vignette is indicative of contemporary Air Force thinking which 
eschews operational concepts and equipment thought of as antiquated. It is 
interesting to note that the A-10 is still in service, and has even gone through a 
SLEP (Service Life Extension Program) to extend its useful life. Had Desert 
Storm not shoved this point down the Air Force’s throat, A-10s would now only 
 
145 James Dunnigan. “Why Afghanistan Still Hasn't Got an Air Force”. Strategy Page. 
January 3, 2004. 
146 Michael J. Dredla. “Commando Vision 21 a Strategic Vision for Air Force Special 
Operations Command.”. p. 38. 
147 Scott A. Fedorchak. “Close Air Support: Repeating the Past…Again?” Air Power Journal. 
Spring 1994. 11 April 2005. 
148 Scott A. Fedorchak. ““Close Air Support: Repeating the Past…Again?” Air Power Journal. 
Spring 1994. 11 April 2005 
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be found in museums. Which raises the question as to what other missions and 
objectives the Air Force discounts “vintage solutions” in favor of technology 
driven approaches? With regards to CAS, the literature is fairly evenly mixed as 
to whether a modern asset (such as F-16s or F-35s) or an older airframe (A-10) 
is more appropriate for service in the U.S. Air Force. However, conventional 
wisdom is not so divisive where thought is given to what lesser developed 
nations should equip themselves with. Almost universally, subject matter experts, 
airpower theorists, and others familiar with the topic, believe that not only is a 
modern asset untenable for most of these nations, but they would be significantly 
less effective than a vintage platform.  
The intent of this particular point is not to prove that a low tech 
solution is appropriate in this case, but that the mindset of the modern U.S. Air 
Force is prohibitive to even exploring such solutions. Herein once again lies the 
value of an organization such as the 6 SOS. The unique nature of the personnel 
employed there, and the missions they handle, creates a rich environment to 
ponder, explore and even witness the possible applications of simpler and 
cheaper approaches to solving vexing tactical problems, not routinely considered 
in the Air Force as a whole. 
3. Tactical 
Last is what has been labeled as tactical concerns. These obstacles do 
not necessarily refer to tactics as traditionally defined (maneuver on the 
battlefield), but rather that the units that execute FID missions are the ones that 
retain sufficient skills and resources to address these concerns. Paradoxically, 
some of these quandaries are obstacles traditionally addressed well above the 
tactical level (such as the acquisition of new aircraft) but the 
squadron/group/wing still remains the appropriately armed level at which to 
tackle these issues. 
a. Urban Shortfall 
Fixed wing aircraft, especially those of the “fighter” variety, have 
justifiably been critiqued for their shortfalls when it comes to conducting urban 
operations. Even for the US, such actions are very difficult to execute well; for a 
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third world nation the difficulty of the task can be exponentially higher. This does 
not mitigate other roles the same platform can provide (discussed previously). 
Additionally, many nations that America counts on to fight terrorism are 
predominately rural and have such large expanses of territory to cover, that no 
asset other than airpower is responsive enough to provide support in any kind of 
timely manner. Plus, in these types of nations the scenario is no longer 
predominately urban, thus the full capabilities of a suitable equipped CAS asset 
can be brought to bear. This situation is highlighted on the Pakistani-Afghan 
border. As of the spring 2004, when intelligence arrives to a Pakistani command 
and control facility of a probable boarder incident, Pakistani response team time 
frequently exceeds the length of the intelligence's value. Ground troops are 
essential in these situations, as many of the intelligence reports end up being 
innocents traversing the border region. A rotary-wing infiltration with a CAS asset 
could conceivable contribute much to the ability of the Pakistani government to 
successfully deal with its porous border.149
As the “trainers”, it is imperative that 6 SOS personnel embarking 
on the road to an AA-FID capability wisely study and learn the lessons of 
historical and modern applications of airpower, and develop tactics appropriate 
for their use. Just as the concept of firebombing an entire town is widely 
accepted as outdated, so might America be moving towards a time when even 
the collateral damage from a “smart munition” is considered unacceptable. 
Grasping the tenuous nature of these lessons is challenging, but even more so 
will be imparting the wisdom of those conclusions to the host nation. The “big 
kids with new toys” syndrome is a very real danger to be avoided, but one that 
comes back to previous discussions of ensuring the U.S. sees eye-to-eye with 
nations it partners with.150
b. A Suitable Training Platform 
 
149 Lt Col Tariq Mahmoud, Pakistani Intel Officer. Personal Interview 3 February 2005. 
150 History is rife with examples of nations attempting to apply new technology or tactics in a 
whole variety of ways not appropriate for their use. Convincing nations that U.S. mistakes can be 
their gains will be an imperative objective and one that must be addressed at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level. 
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This issue has been, and continues to be, a sticking point. “It is cost 
prohibitive to train in every aircraft listed in theater requirements. Therefore, while 
at home station advisors train in categories and types of aircraft generally 
representative of those operated by friendly foreign aviation forces The aim is to 
build transferable skills that can be relied upon for expeditions yet safe 
qualification in a variety of foreign platforms.”151 Johnson reflects on how even 
though the method for selecting initial rotary and fixed wing platforms for the 6 
SOS followed conventional wisdom on this unconventional topic, peculiarities of 
the tasked proved to make the process problematic: 
Some in fact averred that FID planners wished to return to the 
‘good old days’ of a propeller-driven ‘junkyard air force.’ 
Regrettably, this myopic perspective played right into the hands of 
US Army officers at USSOCOM, who were convinced that the 6 
SOS was a threat to Army special operations helicopter 
modernization programs—particularly efforts to upgrade the 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment with the MH-47E and the 
MH-60K. When the senior US Air Force general officer on the 
USSOCOM staff accused AFSOC of pursuing a ‘flying club,’ efforts 
to acquire suitable aircraft for the 6 SOS shut down and aviation-
FID planners were forced to seek ‘non-material’ alternatives (what 
one AFSOC planner termed ‘creative ventures’). The proximate 
cause of the ‘flying club’ accusation was the request for three 
unique aircraft for the aviation-FID initiative: the Basler Turbo (T)-
67, the Pilatus ‘Porter’, and the Ayres ‘Vigilante.’ 
AFSOC FID planners advocated a ‘family of aircraft’ for the 6 SOS 
representative of those found in, and more importantly useful to 
Third World air forces. The candidate aircraft were examined 
according to very specific criteria. First, these aircraft should enable 
6 SOS crews to develop and perfect the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures required to advise, train, and assist Third World air 
forces in the employment of their existing aviation assets. 6 SOS 
pilots and other crewmembers would necessarily have to be active 
flyers, current and qualified in ‘like’ systems. Without currency and 
proficiency, aviation-FID advisors would lack all-important credibility 
with the foreign commanders and crews they would be expected to 
advise and train. Moreover, 6 SOS maintenance personnel—
aviation-FID advisors and trainers in their own right—would 
similarly require ‘hands-on’ experience with aircraft comparable to 
 
151 Normal J. Brozenick, Jr. “Another Way to Fight: Combat Aviation Advisory Operations.” 
P. 21. 
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those found in the developing world. More importantly, few if any 
countries will seriously consider recommendations regarding off-
the-shelf platforms if the US Air Force does not itself possess 
representative types of the very aircraft we are advising them to 
use. A perfect example of this reticency was reflected in the failure 
of the Northrop F-20 program, an aircraft which was designed from 
the ground up to be an export fighter. Not one country bought the 
F-20 for the simple reason that the US Air Force did not own and 
operate the airplane. 6 SOS ownership of alternative technology 
platforms serves as a strong role model for air forces in the 
developing world. Moreover, ownership of such aircraft can 
contribute significantly to other USSOCOM missions, particularly 
covert and unconventional warfare operations.152
In light of these types of issues and obstacles, since so much of the 
success of AA-FID operations rides on the professionalism and competency of 
the CAAs, it is imperative that an appropriate aircraft be acquired to serve as a 
AA-FID training platform. But there is no clear-cut solution to the present issue of 
what asset should be used for attack aviation FID personnel to maintain skill 
currency. Just because there is not a perfect answer, however, does not mean a 
partial solution cannot fit the bill for the 6 SOS to attain and remain capable, 
competent and ready to perform attack related FID missions. This author 
recommends that the 6th initially needs to acquire an affordable and 
representative airframe; time and experience will help determine which aircraft 
will be best suited for a “fighter” inventory.  
An anonymous study named Project AFAC-Dragonfly, broached 
the issue of a suitable CAS platform for the United States. The author argues that 
given two spectrums of possible conflict for the U.S. (nation-state and campaigns 
against sub-national groups) no suitable asset remains in the inventory to 
effectively execute CAS and AFAC (Airborne Forward Air Controller) missions. 
Additionally, an appropriate asset may be found in considering older technology 
airframes with minor modern enhancements. “What we propose is that the AFAC 
needs of both sub-national and nation-state conflicts CAN be met if the aircraft 
has the aerodynamics that enables it to fly fast enough to penetrate IADs at high 
 
152 Wray Johnson. “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense.” Aerospace Power Journal. 
Spring 1997. 
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subsonic speeds yet can fly slower in the absence of the IAD threat to detect, 
locate, mark and kill/suppress fleeting sub-national group targets.”153 Although 
the pursuit described in that work is not completely commensurate with this 
study, it ponders some of the same questions and thus provides some useful 
reference points. 
The substance of the argument is that, given the constraints of 
those operations, an older technology airframe might be more appropriate for 
today’s missions. From Project Dragonfly, several key/relevant contents can be 
extracted that may be of assistance in addressing AA-FID issues. Those 
include:154
• Aircraft characteristics: 
• Fast enough to survive surface to air munitions. 
• Slow enough to locate, mark and attack ground 
targets. 
• Carry sufficient ordnance. 
• Easy to operate. 
• Safe to operate. 
• Easy to maintain. 
• Durable/rugged. 
• Inexpensive. 
• Able to operate from unimproved surfaces. 
• Easily transportable. 
• Seat two. 
• Survivable. 
• Moderate service ceiling. 





153 “Project AFAC – Dragonfly”. 20 January 2005. p 2-3. 
154 “Project AFAC – Dragonfly”. 20 January 2005. p 2-3. 
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• Rescue (land at a remote field and place the survivor 
in a vacant seat). 
• Candidate aircraft: 
• A-4 SkyHawk 
• Thrush AY-65 Vigilante 
• OV-10 Bronco 
• OA-37 Dragonfly 
Major Brian Downs noted that the “ideal CT/COIN aircraft for 
nations with limited resources should have a robust intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and be able to strike targets immediately 
when they are positively identified, and yet it must be inexpensive and simple to 
maintain and operate.  The aircraft should have a long endurance for extended 
loiters, be able to operate in rugged terrain, and be difficult to detect.”155 Having 
begun to outline the playing field of what characteristics the 6 SOS should seek 
in selecting a light-attack training platform, a review of the spectrum of features of 
aircraft currently in use around the world for attack aviation mission yields the 
following list:156 
• Inexpensive to procure 
• Inexpensive to operate (maintenance and POL) 
• Can be maintained in an austere environment 
• Can operate from unimproved, short airstrips 
• Wide range of operational speeds (at least as slow as 100 kts, and 
at least as fast as 200 Kts) 
• Seats 2 (pilot and system operator) 
• Widely represented in national inventories 
• Can simulate a wide variety of munitions (air-to-ground) 
 
155 William Brian Downs. “Unconventional Airpower”. Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 
2005. p 7. 
156 This list is a compilation of inputs from various individuals interviewed at the 6 SOS by 
the author, as well as the authors own experience and a review of the characteristics of the 
aircraft outlined in the 6 SOS’s MAT study. Potential characteristics also drawn from, Richard D. 
Newton. Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Air Forces for Foreign Internal Defense. Aug 1991, p. 
6. Sub bullets are specific items that the host nation would desire in an airframe, and thus the 6 
SOS would want to train to. 
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• Free fall bombs 
• Rockets 
• Fixed forward firing guns 




• Data link 
• NVG compatible 
• Targeting pod 
• Good air-to-ground visibility  
• Good loiter time (min 3 hours) 
• Survivable 
• Armored 
• Twin engine 
• Unimproved landing surface capability 
The issue of “airspeed” is an important one; aircraft that must 
operate at slow velocities are particularly vulnerable to surface to air munitions, 
whereas those that must operate at high velocities are unsuited for many of the 
roles discussed herein. Even the U.S. is subject to this same paradigm, such as 
F-16s which are highly capable and survivable, but due to qualities of their flight 
regime, have difficulty in executing roles that require continued and persistent 
coordination with detailed ground operations. Mr. Klingaman noted, “the mission 
of continuous, armed, low-altitude visual reconnaissance and surveillance of the 
guerrilla operating area is probably the most important application of air power in 
the limited-intensity warfare, and it is the one for which the U.S. Air Force is least 
prepared. It is a mission that high-speed fighters are incapable of performing, 
especially when it is combined with other mission options inherent in light armed 
surveillance aircraft.”157  
 
157 Jerome W. Klingaman, "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," in Dean, 123-38. 
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Some of the airframes that might be considered for this role 
include: 
• Rockwell OV-10 Bronco 
• Northrop T-38 Talon (F-5 Tiger II) 
• T-37 Tweet (OA-37 Dragonfly) 
• AT-802 Air Tractor, a.k.a, Thrush AY-65 Vigilante 
• Sukhoi SU-25 Frogfoot 
• Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatros 
• Cessna O-1 Birddog 
• Cessna O-2 Skymaster 
The Rockwell OV-10 stands out as a strong candidate, but is not 
the sole contender. Acquisition of an initial airframe (possibly as a leased asset) 
will “get the squadron’s foot in the door”. From this position, the 6th can start the 
process of maintaining a small cadre of pilots, maintainers and support personnel 
with baseline skill sets in this role. Once a core competency and capability is 
attained, the 6th can “spin-up” teams in a target airframe, as required.158 The 
greater diversity of attack platforms, fire control systems and munitions will make 
this a more challenging task for the squadron than a “normal” spin-up. To 
mitigate the associated risks and costs, the squadron should stick to a short list 
of nations/airframes they will assist with, until this operational capability is 
rehearsed and field tested. Eventually, experience and manpower will allow a 
slow and planned expansion to additional platforms and partners, possibly even 
allowing for more than one type of attack platform being maintained by the 
squadron. 
c. Ensuring Compliance II 
As mentioned above, ensuring host nations utilize assets and skills 
in a U.S. endorsed manner is also an issue of tactical concern. In each 
downrange operation the 6 SOS must ensure that only adequately trained and 
 
158 This is the manner in which helicopter and transport pilots prepare for a deployment. 
Although a crew may maintain their primary currency in a Lockheed C-130, if the host nation 
operates Russian built An-2 Colts, the team will begin to focus on this airframe at some 
predetermined time prior to the deployment. To include contracting access to a Colt so the pilots 
can develop proficiency in that asset. 
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professionally competent Combat Aviation Advisors are sent into the field. It falls 
to the role of these professionals to impart not just the physical skills and 
knowledge to utilize the equipment/training being offered, but also instill a sense 
of the greater importance of their new skill. Many third world nations operate with 
what the U.S. would consider to be antiquated values with regards to some 
issues, such as human rights. For instance, if a CAA team can convince their 
counterparts that collateral damage from a rocket attack in a busy market is 
tactically unwise because of potential local, insurgent and even international 
backlash, then that might be the final piece in pre-empting that type of operation. 
In other similar matters, CAA can serve to be an educational lynchpin that helps 
to ensure that behavior by the host nation is not only responsible but effective. 
C. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s there were a number of sponsored and 
independent studies that addressed the question of whether the U.S. Air Force, 
and Special Operations in particular, should stand-up an aviation Foreign Internal 
Defense squadron. Some of the more note-worthy of those studies include: Major 
Koster’s Foreign Internal Defense: Does Air Force Special Operations Have 
What it Takes, Major Moulton’s Role of Air Force Special Operations in Foreign 
Internal Defense, Major Newton’s Reinventing the Wheel: Structuring Air Forces 
for Foreign Internal Defense, and Lieutenant Colonel Johnson’s Whither Aviation 
Foreign Internal Defense. These studies were focused on determining whether 
aviation FID “made sense”, and then once an aviation FID squadron had been 
formed, advocating that the 6 SOS could only accomplish its objectives 
satisfactorily if the squadron possessed organic assets, indigenous to the nations 
they worked with. 
Both arguments were hotly debated and contested, but eventually 
accepted. The formation of the precursor to the 6 SOS (a two-man cell at HQ 
AFSOC, Plans and Programs) occurred in the spring 1991 with the 6 SOS 
coming fully on-line in April 1994.159 The squadron acquired their first rotary-wing 
 
159 Wray Johnson. “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense”. Aerospace Power Journal. 
Spring 1997.   
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asset in 1996, and their first fixed wing plane soon thereafter later. Although the 
arguments of those studies were instrumental in acceptance of aviation FID as a 
concept, one of their recommendations has never been enacted. All four authors 
noted the importance (as well as the risks) of “fighter roles” as part of the FID 
process. Yet despite 1) Koster’s, “need for slow-flying, forward-firing aircraft [to 
perform CAS]”, 2) Newton’s “fire support is an important and viable mission for 
aerial forces conducting counterinsurgency operations” with the squadron 
possessing “light-attack aircraft”, 3) Moulton’s “Close air support and interdiction 
are undeniably important in security and neutralization”, and 4) Johnson’s “Since 
the mission was to assist foreign air forces with respect to the totality of airpower, 
the unit would comprise a diverse mix of specialties, including fighter, airlift ,and 
helicopter pilots”, the 6 SOS has never wholly progressed to executing the 
“fastmover FID” side of this equation.  
Regardless of what theoretical or practical approach those four authors 
chose to tackle these issues, all came to similar conclusions; attack aviation FID 
has an important role as part of U.S. foreign policy, but it must be executed with 
exacting care and consideration. This study has approached the question from a 
quantitatively different and significantly broader view than any one of those 
authors, but with the same conclusion. By using Newton’s method of analyzing 
what doctrine and strategy directs SOF forces to accomplish, Moulton’s review of 
what airpower contributes to COIN/CT actions, and Koster’s and Johnson’s 
contrast of requirements versus assets, and now this authors addition of various 
forms of evidence that attack aviation skills are needed by American partner 
nations (all in the new context of the post September 11th environment) a clear 
statement of the situation and possible solutions emerges. 
Inclusion of offensive skill sets for the Air Force’s first dedicated aviation 
Foreign Internal Defense squadron was a daunting concern for political and 
military leadership when the 6 SOS came to be. In the ten years since, Combat 
Aviation Advisors have shown themselves to be a professional organization, 
capable of tackling challenging scenarios in austere locations; results that have 
led to increased expansion and recognition of their potential contributions to 
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Combatant Commanders. In light of their developmental progress and prowess, 
and capabilities demanded by the global war on terrorism, this study suggests 
that it is now time to take the first fledgling steps towards the addition of “fighter 
skill sets” to the 6 SOS repertoire.  
The first action requires that the 6 SOS must invest a minimal amount of 
time, money and manpower into building AA-FID professionals; hiring 1 aviator 
with fighter pilot experience, acquiring a “fighter type” platform, and the 
appropriate infrastructure/personnel to support both. From this “crawl” position, 
the squadron will be poised to transition to “walk” at some point in the future by 
providing elementary attack skill sets to capable and committed allies (of which 
the Philippines stands out as a prime example). As these proof of concept 
operations achieve their objectives, the squadron will be able to bolster the 
number of personal and equipment designated for this mission, and eventually 
reach the “run” stage wherein assistance can be provided to a greater breadth of 
nations in increasingly varied aircraft and missions. Due to the inherent risks of 
these missions though, “run” for fighter operations will probably never reach the 
levels of the helicopter and fixed-wing missions the 6 SOS currently embraces. 
Throughout this process, other supporting mechanisms must be engaged 
to ensure the success, efficacy, and sensibility of fighter operations. Initially, FID 
educated commanders supplying quality FID information to military-political 
leaders will create new strategic and tactical opportunities for America. Then 
aviation FID experts at the squadron level can take baby-steps to implement this 
strategy at the tactical level. This combination of politically smart decisions 
executed professionally would fill a small but needed niche in this modern and 
turbulent world. 
In the end, the Air Force will have invested a small amount of capital 
(fiscal and human) to build an off the shelf capability that has a direct and needed 
application in many places around the world. Just as CAS type roles have been a 
vital part of U.S. military operations throughout the years, they remain so for 
lesser developed allies. With U.S. assistance, those allies will be able to 
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prosecute counterinsurgent, and counterterrorist operations with the benefit of 
U.S. training and more importantly U.S. insight on the best way to strategically 
and tactically employ those elements. This “makes sense” strategy, if executed 
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APPENDIX 
A. STANDARD AIR FORCE MISSION DEFINITIONS160 
Air Interdiction – Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize or delay the 
enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively 
against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed 
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly 
forces is not required.  
Close Air Support – Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile 
targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require 
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of 
those forces. Also called CAS. 
Counter Air – A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to 
attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority.  Counter air 
missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, 
both before and after launch. 
Counter land – Operations conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of 
superiority over surface operations by the destruction, disruption, delaying, 
diverting, or other neutralization of enemy forces. The main objectives of 
counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and 
prevent the opponent from doing the same. 
Escort – [Def 1.] a combatant unit(s) assigned to accompany and protect another 
force or convoy.[ Def 2.] Aircraft assigned to protect other aircraft during a 
mission. 
Foreign Internal Defense – Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society 
from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. Also called FID. 
Forward Air Controller – An officer (aviator/pilot) member of the tactical air control 
party who, from a forward ground or airborne position, controls aircraft in 
close air support of ground troops. Also called FAC. 
Forward Air Controller (Airborne) – A specifically trained and qualified aviation 
officer who exercises control from the air of aircraft engaged in close 
support of ground troops. The forward air controller (airborne) is normally 
an airborne extension of the tactical air control party. Also called FAC(A), 
Internal Development – Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by 
building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that 
respond to the needs of its society). 
 
160 Unless otherwise noted, all definitions are from Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Apr 2001, amended 9 May 2005. 
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Search and Rescue – The use of aircraft, surface craft (land and water), 
submarines, specialized rescue teams, and equipment to search for and 
rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. Also called SAR. 
B. POTENTIAL “FASTMOVER FID” TRAINING PLATFORMS161 
 
 
Figure 5.   Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatros (Jane’s) 
    
Figure 6.   Cessna OA-37 Dragonfly. (Jane’s) 
  
Figure 7.   Northrop F-5 Tiger II (from Jane’s) 
                                            
161 All photos from “Jane’s.” Online Research. 
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Figure 8.   Rockwell OV-10 Bronco (Jane’s) 
 
 
Figure 9.   Air Tractor AT-802, Crop Duster Version (Jane’s)  
 
 
Figure 10.   Thrush Vigilante, “Modified” AT-802 (Jane’s) 
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Figure 11.   Sukoi SU-25 Frogfoot (Jane’s) 
 
 
Figure 12.   Cessna 0-1 Bird Dog (Jane’s) 
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